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This thesis seeks to explain the domestic politics of Poland's road toward the European 
Union membership. Insights into the Polish domestic politics of the European Union membership 
can, therefore, also help in investigating the EU membership drives of other Eastern European 
countries. For this thesis, I have selected for analysis few crucial domestic players: political parties, 
the Catholic Church, trade unions, and the general public. 
Chapter two of my thesis presents historical background and the route of Poland towards the 
EU accession. I present a historical review of the Polish route toward the European Union through 
association agreements, pre-accession strategies, etc. with the European Union that were negotiated 
between 1989 and 2001. 
Chapter three analyzes the political parties that play a major role in the enlargement process. Due 
·to combination of circumstances and necessities, by the mid-l 990s the Polish membership in the EU 
became a significant objective of Polish political parties. It happened because of the new goals 
sought by successive Polish governments and changes to strategies employed in order to reach the 
European Union's standards. As a result, the chapter starts with the analysis of the dynamics of the 
transition process toward democracy by discussing major characteristics of political parties. Then, I 
present three stages of party development on Polish political scene and discuss major differences in 
political programs among major political parties through the emerging party system. 
Chapter four investigates the Polish Catholic Church position toward the European Union 
enlargement. I portray the historical structure of the Polish Catholic Church since the early 1980s and 
explain possible future threats and challenges for the Catholic Church in Poland. 
Chapter five describes the central role of trade unions in EU membership process. It analyzes 
present and future challenges by investigating two Polish trade unions that are politically strong in 
contemporary Polish politics. 
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Finally, chapter six focuses on the impact of the European Union membership debate on public 
opinion attitudes. It presents how internal factors influence citizen attitudes toward the EU 
membership. Also, the chapter examines the changing patterns of support for the EU membership 
and introduces the possible reasons for the public support decline and its future implications. 
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CHAPTER 2. IDSTORICAL CONTEXT 
The Cold War ended rather abruptly with the momentous changes that took place in Eastern 
Europe in 1989. Central and European countries freed themselves from Soviet hegemony and set out 
to introduce democratic governments and market economies. Among them there was a Polish state 
that tried to put on democratic structures and conditions into domestic politics. In this process Poland 
and other former communist countries turned to the West for assistance and started to seek closer 
cooperation with western organizations, especially the European Union. This chapter reviews 
historical aspects of Polish entry into the European Union since 1989. 
The first portion of this chapter examines the trade and cooperation agreements with the EU 
that were negotiated between Poland and the EU at the beginning of their relationship. The second 
part of this chapter presents the association agreements that took place later in time and created a 
background for future enlargement. Moreover, the third part introduces Poland's strongest 
characteristics that would prepare the Polish state and its society for a full membership in the 
European Union. Also, the broad portion of this part examines the membership and pre-accession 
strategies that has been developed between Poland and the EU during 1998-2000. 
1. Cooperation and trade agreements as a first step toward integration process 
The process of transformation of the Polish system into democratic structures and Polish 
economy to market system in the 1990's was accompanied by the opening up of that country towards 
Western European structures. This phenomenon was justified by expectations of increasing security 
and stability of democratic institutions, creating conditions for overcoming the economic and 
technological gaps as well as accelerating forms. Also, in case of Poland's integration strategy, the 
question was one of pursuing a policy, which would lead to Poland's return to Europe and at the same 
time maximizing Poland's ability for changes. Also, the question was one of what could and should 
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be attempted in the short term in order to enter the European structures. Polish policy-makers were 
also acutely aware that Soviet sensitivities still needed to be taken into account. Therefore they knew 
they had to explore a range of possibilities and not necessarily select the most optimal of alternatives. 
Not only was there uncertainty over Poland's future geopolitical role, Poland was shortly to 
experience the 'shock therapy' on economic and domestic policy. This therapy was designed to 
effect a transition away from the centrally planned economy as quickly as possible in order to 
facilitate Poland's entry into the European Community. This move in the economic sphere was 
complemented by the initiation of a program of institutional reform in other areas aimed at creating 
civil society and a liberal democratic political culture. Furthermore, EC member-states were also 
preoccupied with other more pressing matters such as the Gulf War, which affected the EC both 
individually and collectively. Also, the community was engaged with Agenda 2000, creation of a 
single internal market, and preparations for the Maastricht summit in 1991, which paved the way for 
the creation of the European Union. 
As for Poland, in September 1989, it signed a non-preferential Agreement on Trade and 
Commercial and Economic Cooperation with the European Communities. 1 This agreement ended a 
period of almost fifteen years of trade relations with the European Communities without any formal 
base. However, the progress of reform in the political and economic fields needed a better 
institutional solution than the mentioned agreement. Therefore, in May 1990, the Polish government 
applied for association status in the EU. On the 16th of December of 1991 as a result of eleven 
month's negotiations both parties signed the Europe Agreements establishing the association of 
Poland with the European communities and their member states. It was entered into force on the I st of 
February 1994.2 In this particular agreement the trade part aims to establish as free trade area over a 
1 More on the EU agreements could be found at http://www.eunmionorg/legislat/extrel/cec/polandhtm 
2 Podraza. Andrzej. Stosunki Polityczne i Gospodarcze Wsoolnoty Eurooeiskiej z Panstwami Europy 
Srodkowej i Wschodniej. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1996: 296 
--. Unia Europejska a Europa Srodkowa i Wschodnia. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu 
Lubelskiego, 1997 
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maximum of ten years, on a basis of reciprocity by Poland and asymmetric by the European Union. 
For instance, it promises a more rapid liberaliz.ation on the side of the European Union. It takes the 
objective of future membership of Poland into account and provides a framework for Poland's 
gradual integration into the European Union. Principally, the Europe Agreements are based on shared 
understandings and values that prepare the EU and the partner countries to converge economically, 
politically, socially, and culturally. The Europe Agreements provide the means whereby the 
European Union offers associated countries the trade concessions and other benefits normally related 
with full memberships of the EU.3 In addition to the liberalization of trade, the Europe Agreements 
also contain provisions regarding the free movement of services, payments, and capital in respect of 
trade and investments, and the free movement of workers. Also, under the Europe Agreements the 
partner countries commit themselves approximating their legislation to that of the European Union, 
particularly in the areas relevant to the internal market.4 Generally, the Europe Agreements become a 
framework within which Poland and other applicant countries are preparing for membership. 
Since implementation of the Europe Agreements, all subsequent governments in Poland have 
demonstrated their determination and obligation in supporting activities that lead towards closer 
integration with the European Union. Thus as a result of diplomatic efforts by Poland, the European 
Council in Copenhagen, Denmark officially confirmed in June 1993 that "associated countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Association 
will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume obligations of membership by 
satisfying the economic and political conditions required. "5 According to the European Council in 
order to meet the criteria for a full membership, the candidate country has achieved institutional 
stability, guaranteeing democracy, and the rule oflaw, human rights and respect for and protection of 
3 http://europa.eu.int/conun/enlargement/pas/Europe_agr.htm. April 4, 2002 
4 More on the approximation could be found in Article 68 of Poland's Europe Agreement; also in 1996 Poland 
f ublished a series of legal studies outlining its path to approximation 
Synowiec, Ewa. "Polish Perspective on EU Membership: Problems Faced in the Adaptation Process" in 
Laursen, Finn and Soren Riishoj. The EU and Central Eurooe: Status and Promects. Esbjerg, Denmark: South 
Jutland University Press, 1996: 240 
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minorities; has introduced a market economy system; is able to cope with competitive pressures and 
market forces within the Union; and has the capacity to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. 6 
Moreover, the Polish government on April 8, 1994 passed a formal application for 
membership in the European Union (Table 2.1). It was as a result of meeting in Copenhagen and in 
Essen later that year. Furthermore, in December of 1994, 'lhe Essen European Council embarked 
upon a pre-accession strategy to prepare the countries, which had signed an association agreement 
with the European Union for membership."7 This strategy focused once again on the Europe 
Agreements; the White Paper8 that was presented in May of 1995; and the Phare Programme, 9 which 
is a pivotal financial tool in the pre-accession strategies. It needs to be added that Poland has 
participated in the structured dialogue, seeing it as a priority in its foreign policy. Poland has 
submitted background documents for a number of structured dialogue meetings, and has made 
proposals to improve the dialogue. Although the above mentioned criteria are of a qualitative 
character, Poland is also expected to fulfill the convergence criteria from the Treaty ofMaastricht, 
which came into force on November 1, 1993. The aim of this strategy is to foster cooperation 
between states, regions, and interest groups of the European Union and Central Europe countries. 
The criteria embrace factors such as price stability, budget deficit ratio, government debt, interest 
rates, and participation in the exchange rate mechanism. 
6 Ibid.:241 
7 "Enlargement: Preparing for Accession." 15 April 2001 <htlp://europaeu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e4000 l.htm> 
8 It set up priorities for the barmoni7.ation of legislation and for each sector of the internal market; more could 
be found in: Gower, Jackie and John Radmond. Enlarging the European Union. Brookfield: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2000: 44-53 
9 The European Commission program, in which main objectives and new priorities of the program are viewed 
through the enlargement process; a kind of support provided to both candidate and non-candidate country; more 
on Phare Programme could be found in: "Program Phare 1994." Monitor Integracji. Jan. 1995. 4 April 2002 
<http//:www.ukie.gov.pl> 
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Table 2.1: Accession Process 
1. A European state submits an application for EU membership to the European 
Council 
2. The Council of the European Union asks the European Commission to present 
an Opinion on the application 
3. The Commission presents the Opinion on the candidate's application to the 
Council 
4. The Council unanimously adapts a decision to start the negotiations with the 
candidate state 
5. The Council chaired by the Council Presidency conducts negotiations with the 
candidate state 
6. The Commission proposes, and the Council agrees to and unanimously adapts, 
guidelines for the EU position in the negotiations with the candidate state 
7. The draft of the Accession Treaty is agreed on between the EU and the 
candidate state 
8. The Accession Treatv is submitted to the Council and the European Parliament 
9. The European Parliament approves the Accession treaty with a simple majority 
vote 
10. The Council unanimously approves the Accession Treaty 
11. The Member State and the candidate state officially siirn the Accession Treaty 
12. The Member States and the candidate ratify the Accession Treaty 
13. Upon ratification the Accession Treaty becomes effective: the Candidate State 
becomes a Member of the European Union 
Source: Based on a chart by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA 
Therefore, in order to increase a practical dimension of the pre-accession strategy the 
European Council at its meeting held in Cannes in June of 1995 accepted the White Paper on 
'Preparation of the Associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the 
Internal Market of the Union.' 10 The substantial core of the White Paper has been affirmed by the 
Union and the applicant countries as a priority in the integration process. This document was 
intended to guide and assist the efforts already undertaken by the applicant countries. The purpose 
was to enhance a market economy system within applicant countries and their economic 
competitiveness. Also, the White Book was accepted in May of that year by Polish government, and 
10 Synowiec, Ewa. "Polish Perspective on EU Membership: Problems Faced in the Adaptation Process" in 
Laursen, Finn and Soren Riishoj. The EU and Central Europe: Status and Prospects. Esbjerg, Denmark: South 
Jutland University Press, 1996. 
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the official visit of the government delegation with Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was sent to the 
meeting of the European Council in Cannes. The main message that was delivered at this meeting 
was to continue structured relations with the European Union and to carry on a main theme of 
structured dialogue that was mentioned as an important part of the Europe Agreements. 
To improve implementation of the Europe Agreement and the development of pre-accession 
policy, the Intergovernmental Conference took place in March of 1996. In its opinions on the 
applicant countries, the Commission had to assess the situation of each applicant country even though 
the Commission had never before had to handle simultaneously as many as ten opinions on 
applications for membership. Moreover, the Commission lacked detailed information about the 
candidate countries. Lastly, the gap between these countries and the existing member states in terms 
· of economic and social development was greater than in the case of any previous enlargement. 
Mainly, the Commission relied on information provided by the applicant countries. In April of 1996, 
the Commission sent to the ten countries a series of questions covering all the main areas of the 
'acquis' in the form of a questionnaire of 150 pages with 23 chapters, asking for economic, statistical, 
and legislative information.11 It was carefully reviewed and analyzed by the Polish government and 
sent back to the appropriate bodies within the European Union organization. In order to coordinate 
laws for the possible future adjustment, new institutions were established within the Polish state. 12 
Moreover, Poland has been continuously participating in regular meetings of the foreign ministers of 
the associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe. It means that Poland participates in it 
along with the foreign ministers of the Union since October 31, 1994. Another pivotal meeting took 
place in June of 1996 at the Florence European Council where the Council adopted a detailed 
timetable for negotiations with the Central and Eastern European countries. 
11 Gower, Jackie and John Radmond Enlarging the European Union. Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing 
Co1npany,2000:44 · 
12 The Association Council, the Association Coilllllittee for Agree1nent, and the Joint Parliamentary Conunittee 
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The final step of opening negotiations was marked by the successful conclusion of the 
Intergovernmental Conference by adopting the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. In terms of accession, 
the treaty set up instructions to be examined later that year and presented to the Luxembourg 
European Council. Moreover, in early 1997, Poland published 'The National Integration Strategy' 
setting out a plan for preparing for accession to the European Union. This document emphasized the 
importance of key pre-accession policies and regulations that would help Poland to benefit from 
transitional periods before achieving a full application of 'acquis.' 
'The National Integration Strategy' was a governmental document prepared by the 
Committee for European Integration. 13 It was aimed at determining the main goals of the integration 
and coordinating their implementation by government administration so as to ensure Poland's best 
possible preparation to membership in the European Union. Also, it focused on tasks stemming from 
the adjustment process during the period preceding integration, during the negotiations and also 
during the initial period of membership. It set in order the hitherto integration-oriented undertakings, 
precise the priorities and identifies the main areas of the adjustment process and the possible 
challenges Poland may face. The Strategy took into account the already existing timetables of the 
adjustment activities and envisaged that negotiations with the European Union on membership will 
start in 1998 and that they would end by the year 2000. This would be followed by the process of 
ratification of the membership treaty by Poland and the EU countries. Currently, this offers hope that 
Poland may acquire European Union membership around the year 2004. 
2. Association agreements and public opinion responses 
By the year 1997, Poland received a big chance to join the European Union -a community of 
democratic states. The crux of all agreements and negotiation documents took place on July 16, 1997 
13 It was established as Government's Act of August 8, 1996; started working on January 28, 1997 according to: 
"Polska na Drodze do Unii Europejskiej." Negocjacie Czlonkowskie. Warszawa, KPRM 1999; the official 
website of the Committee is: <http://www.cie.gov.pl> 
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when the European Commission published Agenda 2000. Accession talks that begun on the 31st of 
March 1998 were likely to be difficult, but Poland had prepared for them very well. There exists an 
awareness in Poland that political sympathies and past contributions to Europe's democratic 
transformation will count less in those negotiations than fulfillment of membership criteria in the 
economic, legal, and social domains and the possibility of meeting the competitiveness standards of 
the world's biggest, uniform market.14 
According to surveys, Poland's entry into the European Union will not highly depend on past 
contributions. Polish entry would hinge on attitudes of domestic actors and government's policies 
toward the enlargement issue. Past surveys conducted in 1998 showed that this entry was supported 
by 56 percent of Poles while only one fourth of those surveyed opposed the entry. Nearly, every fifth 
respondent (19 percent) to this survey did not have a precise opinion in this case. 15 Later on, on June 
6, 2000, the RFE/RL Newsline survey showed the results of the opinion poll done by the Centre for 
Research on Public Opinion (CBOS) in mid-May of2000 (Table 6.1). The results revealed that 59% 
of respondents endorse joining the European Union, while 25% are opposed. 16 Of those polled, 58% 
think Poland was still not prepared economically for integration with the European Union. 
Additionally, the results seem to fall rapidly down because the last opinion poll introduced by 
PAP Agency and conducted by CBOS showed that 55% ofrespondents would vote for Polish 
membership in the European Union ifthe referendum took place in March of2001. Nearly every 
third respondent to this survey would be opposed to the membership. Every second respondent 
thought that Poland was 'a halfway' through to fulfill the full membership criteria. Every fifth 
respondent assumed that there was 'a long way' to achieve this goal, which makes 13% of those who 
thought that it would take 'a very long way.' Nearly, 58% of respondents thought that Poland should 
remodernize economy first and then start to fulfill other criteria. Probably for this reason one third of 
14Parzymies, Stanislaw. "Poland Negotiates EU Accession." Rzeczpospolita 3 0-31 May 1998, natl. ed.: 1 + . 
15 Demoskop Survey. Jan. 2000 <http://dziennik.pap.com.pl/Pol/pol.html> 
16 RFE/RL Newsline 4.109 6 June 2000 <http://www.rferl.org> 
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those surveyed admitted that Poland should become a full member as soon as possible since the 
membership would accelerate modernization and reparation of Polish economy. Moreover, the 
survey showed that only 6% of Poles felt that Poland was getting more benefits in the relationship 
with the European Union, while every second respondent estimated that the European Union was 
receiving more benefits. Only every fourth surveyed believed that relationship was mutual.17 
Apparently, Poland is on its way in preparation for a membership in the European Union. 
According to Stanislaw Parzymies, Poland is worth to be admitted into European Union structures 
because it tries to meet all the criteria given by the European Commission that cover agriculture, 
environmental protection, and the right of Polish citizens to work in other European Union 
countries. 18 Furthermore, Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek19 unveiled ambitious plans in 
September of 1999 to improve internal security, create new jobs and step up efforts to join the 
European Union during his second two years in office. 20 Despite the fact that the negotiations are 
expected to be difficult, it is entirely possible that Poland will be accepted as a member state as soon 
as 2003. One should be aware that these accession negotiations have a very specific character. The 
negotiations are not between two competitors but among the present and future members of the same 
Union. For this reason, both sides are interested in Poland's successful entry into a uniform market 
and political structure. If in the future, for example, Poland shows poor economic results, such as 
balance of payments difficulties, the European Union would be forced to provide financial support (as 
was the case with Greece in the eighties). Unfortunately, a situation such as this one is currently 
present within the Polish state; in 2001, forthe first time since negotiation process was established, 
the European Union decided to exclude Poland from their internal debate about the membership. The 
17 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Opinie o lntegracji Polski z UniaEuropejska. Warsaw: CBOS March 
(March 2-5, 200 la data) 
18 Parzymies, Stanislaw. "Poland Negotiates EU Accession." Rzecmospolita 30-31May1998, natl. ed.: l+ 
19 Elected as a Polish Prime Minister on 21 Sept. 1997 
20 InsidePoland News. 23 Sept. 1999, Warsaw. Electronic (only) Newsletter. <http://www.insideworldcom> 
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European Union made a promise to the countries that show the best progress that it would determine a 
concrete calendar for future enlargement. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Cyprus were 
distinguished among other applicant countries, and also acknowledged by Anna Lindh, the Chief of 
~wedish Diplomacy at the Press Conference on April 14, 2001. While asked about Polish progress, 
Lindh simply responded, ''will see."21 In addition to her response, Guenter Verheugen was silent 
when asked about Poland.22 The ministers decided to work their common approach on May 14, 2001 
while they would try to discuss important restrictions to uniform internal markets in applicant 
countries. Then, the European Commission would have to confirm their propositions. 
Furthermore, the negotiations are not "negotiations" in the traditional sense of the word. 
Poland has to accept the 'acquis communautaire' in its entirety in order to become a full member, 
which means it, has to accept European Union rules. According to Bronislaw Geremek, "Poland is 
now engaged in meticulous examination of its own legal infrastructure, which must be adapted to 
European standards, and in preparations for actual negotiations, which will commence very soon. "23 
He also added that "we ... [Polish people and government] ... must modernize our agriculture 
gradually. We need to expand our tertiary and food-processing sectors and strive to compensate for 
projected unemployment. The real challenge is to increase our GDP, narrow the hiatus between 
Poland and Western neighbors, and to maintain high economic growth."24 Taking his words into 
account and other evidence that I investigate throughout this paper, I would say that Poland has given 
the highest priority to the program of the European integration. Poland is prepared to contribute to 
European growth and development, provide a new economic area of expansion, reshape its own 
economy and assist Europe in meeting challenges, extend the zone of economic and political 
prosperity, and contribute to the cultural heritage of Europe. It can also cement Western and East-
21 Dzieonik PAP. Electronic (only) Newletter. 
<http:l/dzieonik.pap.com.pl/polskawswiecie/20010409203839.html> 
22 Ibid. 
23 Geremek, Bronislaw. "Poland Is Aware of the Difficulties that Lie Ahead." Financial Times 5 Jan. 1998: 32. 
24 Ibid. 
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Central Europe through a wide exchange of ideas and people. It is worth saying that Poland also 
achieved three major steps on the road to meeting major objectives of the European integration: in 
granting of membership to the Council of Europe in 1991, in the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development in 1996, and in NATO structures in 1999. Moreover, Poles perceive 
the idea of including their country in the integration of Europe as part and parcel of political and 
economic transformation. This integration with Western powers would ensure Poland's place in the 
process of maintaining peace and prosperity for all Western European nations. So far, Poland meets 
all the membership criteria stipulated in Articles F and 0 of the Maastricht Treaty25• 
As of November 2000, the outlook for the European expansion was improving even though 
the Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek was disappointed with the accession timetable. He criticized 
the European Union's prediction that it will not conclude accession negotiations with aspiring 
countries until 2002. '"That [prediction] does not satisfy us fully. It raises concerns whether once 
negotiations wrap up in the middle of 2002, it is possible to carry through all ratification procedures 
to enter on January 1, 2003."26 The prime minister also added that Warsaw plans to conclude the 
European Union accession negotiations in 2001. However, the Polish President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski stated in the same year that for the past five years, the European Union membership for 
Poland and other applicant countries seemed as "five years out of reach." In 1995, the date offered by 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was 2000. In 1998, when Poland, together with the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia, opened accession talks, the date was surmised to be 2003. 
But, at the close of the year 2000 there were indicators the "five-year barrier" may be finally 
25 Approved at Maastricht, the Netherlands by the heads of the 12 members of the European Community in 
December 1991, and was signed on February 7, 1992; Article F says that the Union respects the national 
identities of its member states, fundamental rights, and provides itself with the means necessary to attain its 
objectives and carry through its policies; Article 0 says that any European state may apply to become a member 
of the Union 
26 "Polish Premier Satisfied with EU Progress Report ... But Disappointed with Accession Timetable." RFE/RL 
Newsline. 4.218 9 Nov. 2000 <http://www.rferl.org> 
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broken.27 In November of2000, the European Commission issued a report that surprised many by 
saying advanced candidates could finish accession talks as soon as 2002.28 Assuming the first 
accession treaties are signed and ratification by all member states takes 18 months, new members 
could join by early 2004. That timetable was indirectly affirmed by December's European Union 
summit in Nice. Union leaders said in a declaration that they hope the first new members can join in 
time to participate in the next elections to the European Parliament, scheduled for June 2004. 
However, the summit left the timing of any future accessions vague. In addition, the optimism was 
confirmed by the current Swedish European Union presidency that took over the six-month rotating 
European Union presidency from France on January 1, 2001. Sweden's ambassador to the European 
Union, Gunnar Lund, told RFE/RL that by the end of his country's presidency in June, it may be 
possible to answer questions about which countries will be the first to enter and when. However, as I 
mentioned above, the optimism was overstated since it does not look too pro~ising. The remarkable 
progress by countries previously relegated to the second wave such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania Slovakia, and Malta has been seen lately. These countries opened accession talks only at 
the start of the year but have made a rapid progress since then. 29 
I would like to go back to the year 2000 when the European Council meeting took place in 
Nice. The summit took a decisive step in projecting how the members would fit into existing 
decision-making structures. This element seems to be one of the most important ones for future 
membership in the European Union. The difficult debate on how members in the future would decide 
on the most difficult issues followed agreement on a formula to re-weight votes in the important 
Council of Ministers. All of the candidate states were included in the re-weighting and received 
relatively favorable treatment in the assignment of votes. Under the formula, Poland will have equal 
27 Lobjakas, Ahto. "Outlook for EU Expansion Improves." 8 Nov. 2000. 4 March 2002 
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/12/181200.asp> 
28 More could be found in: "Regular Reports." European Commission 4 March 2002. 4 March 2002 
<http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/rg/en/2000/pt0700 .htm#anch03 27> 
29 Ibid. 
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weight with Spain with 27 votes, leaving it just two votes shy of Germany, the European Union's 
most populous country. Summit participants also agreed to raise the number of European Union 
commissioners to 27 from the current 20, suggesting that one day each member will have its own 
commissioner.3° Candidates are still well advised to keep an eye on developments. The next part of 
this paper will introduce these developments that need to be fulfilled in order for Poland to become a 
full member of the European Union community. 
3. Benefits of the future European Union membership 
Poland is becoming ready to join the European Union. It continues its comprehensive 
reforms in every given area of the 'aquis.' The European Council and the European Parliament 
would benefit from Polish membership in a variety of ways and in many areas. 
First of all, Poland presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions 
guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. Secondly, 
Poland can be regarded as a functioning market economy. Thirdly, Poland is on its way to continue 
its efforts on transposition of the 'acquis.' Fourthly, Poland will join the European Union on 
condition that does not jeopardize the level of integration already achieved by the Union. Fifthly, 
Poland will have to pertain to take on the obligations of a Union member. 
There are also areas where Poland needs more help from the European Union in order to 
improve, for example, its communication network and advanced communications. However, Poland 
should become a member of the European Union by the end of 2003. It is the optimal date for 
Poland's accession to the European Union. It is obvious that Poland is a major trading partner to the 
European Union. Poland is the seventh trade partner of the Union. "Since 1989 European Union 
exports to Poland have increased by more than 300%, and amounted to ECU 15 billion in 1995. 
30 Ibid. 
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European Union imports from Poland increased by more than 200% over this period, and amounted 
to ECU 12.2 billion in 1995."31 
The next concern is about Poland's procedures to ensure that the European Union accession 
negotiations would proceed harmoniously in order to achieve European Union membership in the 
early 2151 century. Apparently, Poland fulfills specific requirements by adapting itself to the political, 
economic, and social standards that bind the Union. 
Poland also carries out two programs that are bringing it closer to the European Union 
membership: the first is the National Preparatory Programme for Membership in the European 
Union32 developed by the government of Poland and envisaging ways of incorporating the European 
Union legislation; the second, so-called the Partnership for Membership worked out by the European 
Union, is a program of priority adjustment activities, which Poland should take upon itself in the pre-
accession period. It also considers mechanisms for financing those efforts. Additionally, Poland has 
been undertaking adjustment measures that are indispensable and that it is capable of fulfilling. 
Poland is also making a considerable effort to incorporate community policies on competition, public 
assistance, and government orders and to thoroughly liberalize the principles regulating the flow of 
goods, services, and capital. For example, Polish banking laws have gone a long way to liken 
themselves to solutions prevailing in the Union. 33 
However, Poland needs to work out other areas of interest, for example, complete 
implementation of a social packet, with which countries much wealthier than Poland have had 
problems, also adaptation of Polish agriculture to the Common Agriculture Policy. There are some 
areas where some norms have been already stepped up: steel sector, textiles, and mining with the 
introduction of environmental protection. To help Poland overcome those problems, in 1998 
31 Bulletin of the European Union. Supplement 7 /97, Luxembourg (1997): 12 
32 The program includes training strategies for the European Union accession 
33 Parzymies, Stanislaw. "Poland Negotiates EU Accession." Rzeczposoolita 30-31May1998, natl. ed.: 1+ 
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PHARE34 program was introduced to Poland. It consisted of national allocation (approximately ECU 
150 billion), based on the accession partnership priorities. The main purpose of PHARE program is 
to support Poland in particular justice and home affairs, agriculture, transport, as well as the 
participation in community programs. However, by the end of 1998, the Commission decided to 
reduce this allocation for Poland by ECU 34 million because of a lack of sufficient mature projects 
meeting the priorities of the accession partnership. Following this decision Poland made a number of 
significant changes in the management of the PHARE program. 
The next priority is to help the candidate countries bring their industries and major 
infrastructure up to Community standards by mobilizing the investment required. This effort will be 
largely devoted to areas where Community norms are becoming increasingly demanding: 
environment, transport, industrial plant, and quality standards in products, working conditions, and so 
on. Negotiations on truly difficult issues such as agriculture and the free movement of labor have not 
yet commenced. And before agreement with the candidates can be reached, the European Union 
member countries must agree on changes in the union's own common agricultural policy. 
For the first reason concerning agricultural policy, the Polish Sejm on July 21, 2000 voted by 
363 to four with seven abstentions to confirm a 44-member Committee for European Law intended to 
speed up the adjustment of Poland's laws and regulations to the European Union requirements.35 The 
committee, which consists of lawmakers from all parliamentary groups, is expected to start work right 
away by electing a chairman. It appeared to be a former Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek as the 
one who received this position. According to current Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, the 
aim of the committee is to bring Polish laws into line with the European Union regulations. 'The 
track is still the same, but the train will move faster," Bartoszewski said. The European Union 
34 The European Commission program. in which main objectives and new priorities of the program are viewed 
through the enlargement process; a kind of support provided to both candidate and non-candidate country 
35 "Polish Parliament Approves Committee to Speed up EU-Oriented Legislation." RFE/RL Newsline. 4.140 24 
July 2000 <http://www.rferl.org> 
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Commissioner for Enlargement Guenter Verheugen responded such as: "I'm very optimistic that 
[Poland's] backlog in legislation will be overcome soon." 
Moreover, in September of2000, negotiators in Warsaw said "Poland and the European 
Union are nearing an agreement that would liberalize agricultural trade, thereby removing a key 
obstacle in the country's talk on joining the Union."36 Poland's inefficient fanning sector is 
considered Warsaw's main obstacle to gaining entry to the European Union, for which it hopes to 
qualify by the year 2003. Therefore, on September 27, 2000 Poland and the European Union signed 
an accord to liberalize bilateral trade in agricultural goods. Bruno Dethomas, the European Union 
ambassador to Poland said "the agreement will give Polish farmers much better access to the 
European Union market and prepare them for difficult competition after [Poland's] accession to the 
European Union."37 It simply means that 75% of Poland's farm exports to the European Union 
countries will be exempt from import tariffs. This agreement took effect on January 1, 2001. 
Besides, Poland is still left out of an earlier agreement with other East European countries after 
Warsaw raised import duties (in 1999) on dairy products, sugar, meat, and grains in an effort to 
placate striking farmers. 
The other reason is connected tightly with the free labor movement; Poland takes some 
reasonable and confinnative actions. Poland's Chief Negotiator in the European Union, Jan 
Kulakowski, mentioned earlier this year in February during his seminar in Brussels that some of the 
exceptions the European Union is looking for from candidate states do not seem reasonable and might 
compromise the candidates' competitiveness. He also pointed out the attempt by Germany and 
Austria to deny Polish and other Central and Eastern European workers full access to the European 
Union's labor market for up to seven years after enlargement. He also criticized reluctance of the 
European Union to extend the community's current agricultural subsidies to the new members. In his 
36 "Poland Close to Apement with EU on Farm Trade." RFE/RL Newsline. 4.187 27 Sept 2000. 4 Mar. 2002 <http://www.rferl.OJW'newsline/2000/09/270900.asp>. 
37 "Brussels Sign Farm Trade Agreement." RFE/RL Newsline. 4.188 28 Sept 28 2000. 4 Mar. 2002 
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/09/280900.asp>. 
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point of view, the absence of subsidies would not allow new members to compete with present 
members of the Union - "Poland aims at a fully fledged membership in the European Union, without 
any kind of second-class membership. We want to take up all the obligations stemming from the 
'acquis' - of course, with some necessary transitional arrangements where needed and agreed. But at 
the same time, we want to have full access to all instruments [and] benefits provided by the 'acquis' 
as well. "38 
Apparently, Poland accepts the need to bring its legislation and economy fully in line with the 
European Union's requirements, however it cannot let things go only the way the European Union 
wants to. There are certain areas such as those above-mentioned that require special care and 
attention from both sides. Poland as a future member of the Union has a right and duty to present and 
defend its interests. It is obviously possible through the structured dialogue with the Union within the 
framework of the strategy preparing the country for the membership that was initiated at the European 
Council meeting in Essen in December of 1994. Thus, Poland remains committed to its initial plan of 
concluding entry talks by January 2002 to allow for accession in 2003. 
4. Mutual Advantages between Poland and the European Union. 
Therefore, there are going to be mutual advantages of Poland joining the European Union 
community. First of all, the acknowledged reasons indicate that not only Poland is very interested in 
joining the European Union, but also the European Union representatives and offices are closely 
watching this applicant country. Generally, Poland and its membership in the European Union will 
help to speed up economic development not only within Polish country, but also in the Central and 
Eastern Europe. The European Union will benefit from Polish agriculture and industrial economy. 
Also, going further to the East, a better cooperation with former Soviet Union states may be 
established, and so forth with Russia. For Poland, the great benefit will be a liquidation of a gap that 
38 Speech given by Jan Kulakowski during seminar on the 8 Feb. 2001 in Brussels, Belgium 
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exists between Poland and other countries of Western Europe. Also, Poland has already ensured its 
democratic status among former Communist countries, which gives Poland a great advantage upon 
other applicant countries. This democratic political model of the Polish state will be a great 
consolidator of the values that would link Poland to the European Union states. The membership 
would also elevate Poland's international rank and determine its new place in Europe. This means 
participation in Europe's most serious international organization. By far, Poland's admission in the 
NA TO structure raised its importance all around the world. Although there are some negative 
opinions in this case, the benefits are mutual for both sides. It would be the same turnout in terms of 
Poland's admission to the European Union. Negative reactions would be expected to be unavoidable. 
According to Poland's representatives, the year 2002 or 2003 is the optimal date for Poland's 
accession to the European Union. The years of2001-2002 are a time necessary for ratification of the 
membership and fulfillment of all pre-accession regulations. Also, European Commissioner, Guenter 
Verheugen, supports rapid integration. He says, "January 1, 2003 is an ambitious, but not an 
unfeasible preliminary date for Poland's accession to the European Union."39 He presented his 
opinion last year during a meeting with members of the European Parliament on September 1, 1999. 
The commissioner pointed out that "a further postponement of the EU's expansion may lead to a fall 
in public support for European integration in countries aspiring to EU membership."40 
However, the Polish government may consider rescheduling the target date for its integration 
with the European Union beyond 2003 if the European Union does not liberalize its position on the 
issues that Warsaw sees as most contentious in its membership negotiations. Jan Kulakowski, the 
Poland's Chief Negotiator told "Financial Times-Deutschland" on the 6th of November 2000 that 
those contentious issues include direct subsides for Polish farming, the free purchase of Polish real 
39 <http://www.humanite.presse.fr> 
40 "EU Commissioner Supports Rapid Integration." Newswire. Feb. 9 1999 <http://www.insideworld.com> 
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estate by the European Union citizens the opening of the European Union labor market for Poles, and 
adopting by Poles of the community's environmental protection standards.41 
Also, according to Klaus van der Pas42, responsible for the expansion of the European Union, 
negotiations on the accession of Poland, and other applicant countries will conclude towards the end 
of 2001. Van der Pas said the European Commission was satisfied with the rate at which talks are 
held.43 In his opinion, "in June 2000 negotiations will cover all chapters of the European law. Then, 
the Commission will be able to determine problems, which the candidates will have to solve before 
joining the European Union. ''44 
Lately, the Polish government wanted the Polish Parliament to speed up its work on European 
Union- related laws, and promises that will get organized, too. The Sejm told the government on 
February 18, 200045 to submit a statement by the end of May on the benefits and costs incurred so far 
leading up to accession to the European Union, as well as those expected after European integration. 
The deputies approved this resolution on Poland's preparations to join the European Union in a 376-
26 vote.46 Also, the Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, proposed to put legislation needed for the 
European Union membership on a fast track for parliamentary approval. Buzek said "unless 
legislators worked faster to bring Polish laws up to European Union standards, Poland could miss its 
goal of joining the Union at the beginning of 2003. ''47 European Union officials have said 2004 or 
2005 are more realistic enlargement dates, but the six applicant countries48 that started membership 
talks in the early nineties have stuck to their 2003 target. 
41 "Warsaw to Delay EU Membership Bid Beyond 2003?." RFE/RL Newsline. 4.216 Nov.4 2000 
<http://www.rferl.org> 
42 European Commission's Chief Spokesman in Brussels, Belgium 
43 Politvka. Weekly Magazine. Feb. 28, 1998 




48 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland 
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Surnmazy 
Since the Polish submission of the application for the European Union membership on April 
5, 1994, Poland has been working very hard on achieving this high priority goal. Poland closely 
follows the Union's internal debates, particularly discussions on future monetary policy. Poland is 
aware of the fact that the Union itself seeks a new dimension and new ways to express itself in 
economic, political, and cultural terms. This is one of the reasons why Poland wants to become a 
European Union member - to bring a new dimension to this organization. Even though the 
construction of the bridge between Poland and the European Union has been a long in coming, the 
full membership in the European Union may bring more advantages than disadvantages in the near 
future. Poland has given the highest priority to the program of European integration, and the public at 
large seems to be becoming more familiar with the benefits that go along with the European 
integration. Also, the European Parliament and European Council are aware of Polish progression 
that is taking place in Poland. These two bodies recognize Poland as a great main trading partner and 
they also realize that the relationship between Poland and the European Union grows and will 
strengthen over the next few years. 49 Poland is a great candidate for the European Union accession 
since the building of bridges between the European Union and Poland has rapidly progressed over the 
last six years. Meaning Poland's strategic goal is to have full European Union membership by the 
year 2003 along with the membership of the Council of Europe, the WTO, NATO, and the OECD 
that already has been achieved. Poland has given the highest priority to the program of European 
integration, and is capable of using its own political, cultural, and economic agendas to meet 
European Union's standards. Poland will have to accept any conditions imposed on its entry, but 
Poland will also bring a lot of fresh and methodical qualities. 
49 Johnson, Nicholas. "Poland and the European Union." Economic Outlook. Sept. 9, 1999 
<http://www.masterpage.corn.pl/outlook/> 
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Table 2.2: Chronology of enlargement process 
Event Date Note 
The Association Agreements Dec. 1991 Legal framework for association between the 
aoolicant countries and the EU 
The Copenhagen European Council June 1993 Membership criteria 
The Essen European Council Dec. 1994 Pre-accession strategy 
The Madrid European Council Dec. 1995 Report on the impact of enlargement 
The Florence European Council June 1996 Timetable for negotiations 
The Amsterdam European Council June 1997 Institutional reform 
Agenda2000 July 1997 Policy documentation+ 'acauis' 
The Luxembourg European Council Dec. 1997 Approval of Agenda 2000 
The European Conference Oct. 1997 Endorsement of the French plan for a 
European Conference 
Accession Process Mar. 1998 Negotiations were opened 
The Cardiff European Council June 1998 Screening process for seven chapters had 
been completed 
The Berlin European Council Mar. 1999 Creation oflSPA (structural instrument) and 
SAP ARD (agricultural instrument); financial 
framework for these instruments was 
established 
The Helsinki European Council Dec. 1999 Confirmation of the importance of the 
enlargement process 
The Nice European Council Dec. 2000 Fitting process of new applicant countries 
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CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF 
ENLARGEMENT 
The focus of this chapter is upon political parties in Poland and their significant role in the 
process of enlargement. A particular attention is paid to the characteristics of a party system during a 
transition period and the nature of the socioeconomic cleavage. In this part, I demonstrate that the 
Polish party system will not develop according to the West European model simply because it lacks 
the cleavage structure upon which such systems were built. 50 Instead, the Polish party system reveals 
unique characteristics that could be used to form new political blocs. Moreover, this part investigates 
the changing nature of party organization after 1989 and future problems that Poland's entry into the 
European Union may cause among the current parties and electorate in Poland. 
The consequences of political changes that took place in the late 1980s across Europe have 
given a huge impact to the process of democratization not only within Polish state, but also elsewhere 
in East and Central Europe.51 One of the major areas that have been affected by democratic 
transformations has been the dynamics of party interaction and party system change. These dynamics 
need to be explored and compared to those of the western half of European continent. 
First of all, a creation of an appropriate :framework for the debate about the party and party 
system formation needs to be presented. Thus, the transition towards democracy has been attended 
with the emergence of new societal structures, a new political culture, and new patterns of political 
behavior. These factors were present among new political parties that were engaged in the game of 
politics and among a very competitive political party system that was entailing a construction of new 
political structure. This process of party system building was determined by a group of selected 
individuals with an interest of obtaining political office or political leadership and also by a group of 
50 Pridham and Lewis refrain from referring to the situation in Polish politics as a 'party system', believing that 
it has an 'emerging system', the nature of which needs still to be defined in: Holmes, Leslie. "Towards a 
Stabilization of Party Systems in the Post-Communist Countries." European Review 6.2 (1998):223-248 
51 For further reference: Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition 
in Eastern Europe." British Journal of Political Science 23.4 (1993) 
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politicians competing for electoral votes. 52 According to Cotta, the parameters of a new political 
space have to be defined by both on the elite and mass level dimensions of politics.53 Additionally, 
when analyzing newly created parties on the PQlish scene, other perspectives need to be taken into 
consideration. Namely, organizational and programmatic traits along with strategies in the context of 
the current environmental structure have to be noticed. For instance, competition for votes will create 
a perfect environment for adjusting their policies and programs to meet the needs of society. 54 
In comparison, in Western Europe parties have traditionally been viewed as products of 
social cleavages. According to Stein Rokkan, "mass politics in W estem Europe has been structured 
by major societal cleavages."55 It attempts to explain the creation of parties as the products of these 
cleavage patterns, the parameters of which determine political alignment. It also means that parties, 
once constructed in their modem form have the ability not only to passively or even actively adapt, 
but they have capacity to some extent to create their political and social environment. However, it is 
impossible to assign a universal pattern of party systems creation since there are no parties that would 
fit for all kinds of patterns. A party may use some resources for fulfilling its goals by forming 
political strategies or creating the organizational forms for taking political action. With regard to 
Poland, it needs to be emphasized that the party development is a continuous and goal-oriented 
process. Patterns of change and continuity have had an impact on the formation of those political 
parties that emerged immediately after 1989.56 Polish transition can be explained and understood in 
52 However, there is a little doubt that East European transitions were elite-led changes,and elite had no 
important place in the political discourse of Poles: Higley, John, Jan Pakulski, and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski. 
Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998: 163-201 
53 Cotta, Maurizio. "Structuring the New Party Systems After the Dictatorship." In Pridham Geoffrey and Paul 
G. Lewis. Stabilizing Fragile Democracies. London; New York: Routledge, 1996: 69 
54 Herbut, Ryszard. "The process of structuring the political space." In Cordell, Karl. EU-Poland London and 
New York: Routledge, 2001 
55 Rokkan, Stein and Seymour M. Lipset. Party svstems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. 
New York: Free Press, 1967 
56 This approach has been analyzed by: Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Partv Systems: A Framework for 
Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976:171; and Waller, Michael. "Party Inheritance and 
Party Identities." In Pridham Geoffrey and Paul G. Lewis. Stabilizing Fragile Democracies. London; New York: 
Routledge, 1996:24,25 
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fairly general terms: political party identity that was present after 1989 was a historically-derived 
identity embraced on ideological traditions, organizational continuity, and contemporary political 
appeals that had to be portrayed. Therefore, components of party identity related with the past and 
the present, united with the influence of national and international environment, paired with 
organizational history, have shaped the basis for constructing individual party types present in the 
party system. In order to show Polish party transition, I will examine the successive stages in the 
development of parties in Poland since 1989. 
1. Stages of the political parties development 
It is very difficult to determine the most important parameters of parties and the party system 
within Polish state due to a transition period toward democracy in the 1980s. According to Cotta, this 
is a consequence of at least two factors specific to transition periods. First, the political space is still 
in a state of instability, and second, party identities are not yet specifically defined. Thus, "as a 
consequence, problems internal to parties easily become problems of the party system and vice 
versa."57 Because of those reasons, there are three clearly defined stages in the development of the 
Polish party system. 
The first stage began in 1988 and was concluded with the Round Table Agreement and the 
"contractual" election that took place in 1989.58 There were two political forces, the PZPR (Polish 
United Workers' Party) and its allies; and Solidarity, that perceived one another as ideological rivals, 
but, in fact, neither of them was viewed as having been parties in the classical sense of the word. 
Solidarity was a type of so-called 'non-party' forum or simply a social movement. Moreover, it was 
also considered as an umbrella organization or a specific coalition against the communist regime. 
56 Olson, David M "Compartmentalized Competition: the Managed Transitional Election System in Poland." 
The Journal of Politics 55.2 (1993): 435-41 
57 Cotta, Maurizio. "Structuring the New Party Systems After the Dictatorship." In Pridham, Geoffrey and Paul 
Lewis. Stabilizing Fragile Democracies. London and New York: Routledge, 1996: 71 
58 Olson, David M. "Compartmentalized Competition: the Managed Transitional Election System in Poland." 
The Journal of Politics 55.2 (1993): 435-41 
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Solidarity as such was the natural vehicle that pushed for political changes, however it did not play a 
magnificent role as a political actor due to a lack of political orientation. Hence, Solidarity did not 
have a specific, electoral program going into the 1989 election. Solidarity was a major mass 
organization that tried to mobilize public opinion to oppose the communist regime, however at the 
same time it also constructed a new political regime. Most of all, Solidarity brought into power not 
only a new government, but also a change of political system. As a mass organization Solidarity was 
a representative of the entire public. Also, it possessed some major characteristics usually assigned to 
political parties, such as: horizontal as opposed to vertical ties between party members; it had no 
stable and definite membership, and presented a vague program.59 Simply, Solidarity was an 
organization that derived from the needs of the period of systematic changes. 
The second stage in the transformation process took place between 1990 and 1993. By 1990, 
differences within Solidarity became more visible and process of internal fragmentation began. 
Solidarity started to split up into several groups, some of which became important players during first 
election in 1991. Among these post-Solidarity parties the Democratic Union, the Christian-National 
Union, and the Liberal Democratic Congress appeared on a political horizon. Thus, the process of 
institutionalization of political parties started to shape up Polish political scene. There were several 
specific features of this political institutionalization, namely, "overparticization."60 
The main characteristics of this process was that those parties that on average had some 5.3 
per cent among the Polish electorate started to become powerful players in the distribution of 
resources rather than on a political ground. Parliamentarization allowed parties to start performing 
not only at the grassroots level, but also at the parliamentary level in order to experience to maintain 
59 Herbut, Ryszard. "Partie Polityczne i System Parf.Y.iny." In Antoszewski Andrzej and Ryszard Herbut. 
Polityka w Polsce w Latach 90. Wybrane Problemy. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego 
1998: 116 
60 Agh, Attila "The End of the Beginning: the Partial Consolidation of East Central European Parties and Party 
System." In Pennings, Paul and Jan-Erik Lane. Comparing Party System Change. London and New York: 
Routledge 1998:204,205 
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internal party consensus, clientelism and bureaucratization, which processes appeared remarkably 
quickly for Polish party system. 
The third stage started in the mid-l 990s and was characterized by deeper institutionalization 
of political parties, which was state-oriented. 61 The state became a means by which parties could help 
ensure their own persistence and organizational continuity. This feature is usually present during the 
transformation process when parties try to use the state and its institutions to preserve themselves. As 
a result, cadre parties have developed within Polish party system in order to gain masses through 
television and other mass media. They concentrate on election campaigns and professionalism that 
has been sought among new professionals, consultants, and other agencies. The next section is 
designed to group Polish political parties according to their origins, roles, and ideological criteria. 
2. Main types of political parties on Polish scene 
Political parties that play important roles on the Polish political scene can be easily divided 
into two groups. The first group includes the post-communist parties that were formed after the 
collapse of communist regime in 1989. One of them is the Democratic Left Alliance that was created 
from the dissolution of former PZPR and has assumed a modernizing image with a promotion of 
ideologically free pragmatic direction. The second party is the Polish Peasant Party, which was 
formed in May of 1990 as a successor to the United Peasant Party of the communist period.62 It 
became a strong agrarian party with goals set on a social welfare model of the market economy. This 
party also supports state intervention in the socio-economic spheres, but at the same time strongly 
opposes Polish entry into the European Union. 
The second group consists of the post-Solidarity parties such as the Freedom Union and 
Solidarity Electoral Action. The former one presents itself as a center force that is ready to cooperate 
61 Ibid. :206 
62 Herbut, Ryszard. "Partie Polityczne i System PartY.jny." In Antoszewski Andrzej and Ryszard Herbut. 
Polityka w Polsce w Latach 90. Wybrane Problemy. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego 
1998 
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with both left and right. Pragmatism, market economy, restricted interventionism; privatization, etc. 
seem to be major components of the party's strategy. Moreover, the Freedom Union is considered as 
a key party to support Polish entry into the European Union and as the most Euro-enthusiastic party 
on the Polish scene. On the other spectrum, the Solidarity Electoral Action is resistant to the idea of 
European integration. The party claims that there is an asymmetry of benefits in relations between 
Poland and the European Union. According to party leaders, it lies in the national interest to preserve 
national identity and internal market over Europe. Moreover, the A WS is inspired by Polish Catholic 
values, which emphasize preservation of a national and Catholic identity. However, the post-
Solidarity parties are widely spread, ranging from centrist to right-oriented tendencies. There are 
many small parties within the A WS that cause a political chaos on the right spectrum; hence, a 
tendency toward unification should be sought prior to the EU admission. 63 
3. The emerging party system in Poland 
As previously stated, the contemporary Polish party system is young, having come into being 
just after the 1989 Round Table Agreement. Also, it should be clear by now that it is very 
problematical to fit the Polish case to the complex models of party systems such as those described by 
Giovanni Sartori.64 However, there are signs of stabilization of Polish political system that can be 
examined through various stages of party development since 1989. 
The first stage (1989-1993) is characterized by the process of marginalization of communist 
parties, socialist, and social-democratic parties and formation of center-right parties.65 At least until 
1991, there was a relatively strong center occupied by the Solidarity bloc. In the immediate post-
communist years, party politics was characterized by the domination of historically based cleavages 
63 Interesting discussion could be found in: Stadtmuller, Elzbieta, "Polish Perceptions of the European Union in 
the 1990s." In Cordell, Karl. EU-Poland London and New York: Routledge, 2001 
64 For further reference: Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976 
65 Olson, David M. "Compartmentalized Competition: the Managed Transitional Election System in Poland." 
The Journal of Politics 55.2 (1993): 435 
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based on the attitudes toward the past. Neither socioeconomic cleavages nor any other bunch of 
issues were of any significant importance. Hence, value dimension, attitudes toward religion, 
decommunization process, and lustration did not form a basis for a conflict.66 The major consequence 
of the lack of salience of questions shaped by socioeconomic issues was the failure of the political 
left. 67 However, these issues of liberal democracy and market economy became of important 
significance in party politics of the political right. Divisions appeared not only between post-
Solidarity and post-communist parties, but also among parties that had originated within Solidarity. 
In addition, the value dimension started to assume greater importance. The presence of crosscutting 
cleavages facilitated coalition formation within the Polish government. Moreover, an extreme 
fragmentation of post-communist parties was a reason for a huge number of parties to enter the 
competition for votes and many succeeded in obtaining representation in the lower house of Polish 
government. The party system in Poland started closely resemble the French party system in which 
there are too many parties and their policy programs are too vague. 68 Most of these parties were too 
small and narrow in outlook to articulate the demands of electorate into rational policy programs. 
The center-right wing was very overcrowded and parties tried to outbid each other with illogical 
programs and absurd slogans. Thus, :fragmentation resulted not from crosscutting cleavages but 
rather from personal animosities at the elite level. Also, a lack of loyalties from the electorate toward 
parties could cause a potential :fragmentation. During this period of time, coalition governments were 
the norm since no party was able to secure a majority in the lower house. Furthermore, during this 
period, Poland had four governments with anything from five to seven parties present in government. 
Post-Solidarity parties formed the core of the party system. Two distinct groups of such parties were 
present - "initiating parties, such as the UD and KLD [the Democratic Union and the Liberal-
66 Herbut, Ryszard. "The process of structuring the political space." In Cordell, Karl. EU-Poland London and 
New York: Routledge, 2001 
67 Ibid. 
68 Cave, Andrew. "The Five Percent Solution." Central Europe Review. 10 July 2000 <http://www.ce-
review.org./00/27 /cave27 .html> 
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Democratic Congress], which took the leading role in the complex process of coalitional bargaining, 
and had the last word on the selection of coalition partners. ''69 The second group was called 
"supplementary parties," which consisted of the Christian Social Union and the Peasant Party. In 
effect, there was a unipolar center-right bargaining system with the majority of parties rejecting the 
possibility of grand coalitions. Yet, the characteristics of the Polish party system did not correspond 
to the left-to-right dimension of Western Europe. The cleavage line was between the former ruling 
communist parties and the new, anti-communist parties. This cleavage was cut by one concerning 
value systems and attitudes toward the resolution of socioeconomic problems. The political right 
would always perceive the political left as an unacceptable partner in the bargaining system. 
However, following the 1993 elections, a quite different pattern of political competition took place. 
The second stage, after the 1993 elections, is characterized by a consolidation in the number 
of parties represented in parliament. The number was reduced to six, then after 1997 elections to five 
parties. Since 1993 Poland has had a two-bloc system with parties aligned into two rival alliances: 
post-communist left and the post-Solidarity center-right. After the 1993 election, the post-Solidarity 
leftist Labor Union played a pivotal role until 1997 elections when failed to win parliamentary 
representation. Parliamentary forces have divided into those who support government and those who 
oppose it. Since 1997 elections, the balance of power in parliament is more symmetrical in character. 
One reason for this is the active role of the president as an actor in inter-party bargaining. 
After the 1993 election, the leftist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) did not have enough seats 
to govern on its own and had to opt for coalition with the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL). 
Although the coalition made sense because both were post-communist parties, they had nothing in 
common ideologically. The SLD had established itself as a pro-market and pro-European Union 
oriented party, while the PSL was a conservative, clerical, agrarian, and anti-European Union party. 
Since the post-communist SLD could not form a positive and programmatic coalition within the 
69 Ibid. 
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parliament it did not want to take any risky steps of decision-making process. Because of it, the post-
Solidarity elite saw itself as a future defender of post-communist coalition. Thus, following a defeat 
of Lech Walesa in the 1995 presidential election, the post-Solidarity elite started to form a center-
right coalition. Building upon this work, the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) was founded in 1996. 
After the 1997 elections, the AWS and the Freedom Union (UW) formed a coalition that lasted until 
the 2000 elections. 
During these two stages of emerging party system and into the post-2001 stage, two 
crosscutting types of political conflicts have dominated the process of structuralization of policy 
space in Polish politics. The first type occurs at the socioeconomic level, and deals with issues such as 
market-oriented reform versus state intervention. The main division is between parties that support 
economic liberalism and parties that represent the option of combining economic interventionism 
with a large-scale welfare state. The second type is presented by parties that accord primacy to the 
preservation of national identity and those that support liberal values. Parties' attitudes and policies 
in regard to the process of integration of Poland with the European Union have constituted one of the 
main lines of division within the cultural dimension. It needs to be acknowledged that until mid-
1990s, there was a high degree of consensus among political parties in favor of Polish membership in 
the European Union. Since then, there has been some change in attitudes at both the elite and the 
mass level. 
There are pro-European parties that are more or less unconditional in their support of 
Poland's entry to the European Union. The most important of such parties are the Freedom Union 
and the Democratic Left Alliance. The former has been perceived as the most Euro-enthusiastic party 
and its program concentrates primarily on the technical aspects of integration. For the latter, the 
integration policy remains an important issue. During the 1997 electoral campaign, the party 
employed the slogan 'Europe is Fatherland of Fatherlands.' In doing so, the party opted for a 'federal 
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Europe.' However, both parties identify the issue of integration in rational terms rather than in party 
political terms.70 
There are also parties such as the Solidarity Electoral Action and the Polish Peasant Party, 
whose attitudes towards integration can be characterized as "critical acceptance of the European 
Union. "71 The A WS supports integration process, but insists that national interest should take 
precedence over Europe. There is also a resistance to the surrender of national sovereignty based on 
the belief that the moral obligation of Polish politicians is the preservation of national and Catholic 
identity of the country. The PSL argues that integration should take place on condition that the state 
undertakes to protect the agricultural market. This party is particularly interested in Polish agriculture 
and the consequences of the opening of Polish markets to EU products. Furthermore, in April of 
1999, the Polish Agreement was founded by some conservative politicians as an alternative to the 
pro-European AWS. At the moment, the Polish Agreement represents an attempt by Catholic 
integralist groups, such as the National Party, Polish Family, and Polish Youth, to raise their political 
profile. 
After the 2001 elections, the two main political blocs in Poland became remarkably similar. 
Both rely on trade union patronage, which limits the scope of progressive economic policy and 
produces a U-shaped system where both ends of the political spectrum are similarly bound by the 
protectionist tendencies of the labor movement.72 Moreover, the two main blocs still distinguish 
themselves on socio-cultural issues such as religion and recent history. However, the party that has 
emerged as the main opposition to the leftist parties did not exist a year before. Backed by a slick 
marketing campaign, Civic Platform, known as Platforma, won an impressive 13% in its first 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Cave, Andrew. "Off Balance." Central Europe Review. 16 Oct. 2000 <http://www.ce-review.org> 
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election. 73 It is a centrist grouping of pro-business liberals drawn from the upper ranks of the 
Solidarity Election Action, the Freedom Union and the Left Democratic Alliance. 
Summruy 
The new government will have to preside over some belt-tightening on a domestic level 
through creation of new jobs and will have to bring in an array of new reforms to prepare for the EU 
membership. The last part might experience some opposition from Poland's anti-reform trinity: the 
Church, the unions, and the farmers.74 Their conservative influence may have waned since 1990, but 
agrarian and church-backed parties did surprisingly well in the recent election, winning almost a fifth 
of the vote between them. 
The issue of European membership has become more politicized in Poland after the 2001 
parliamentary elections. Although, there is no evidence at the elite level that attitudes toward 
integration and Europe can be regarded as an independent cleavage line, it becomes more visible that 
the issue of integration tends to play a role among political parties. As the negotiations move on to 
even more specific issues, the probability is that the situation could change. 
73 "Loss of Solidarity." The Economist. E-mail to the author. 4 Dec. 2001 
74"Limping Towards Normality." The Economist. E-mail to the author. 4 Dec. 2001 
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CHAPTER 4. THE POLISH CATHOLIC CHURCH 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce a changing nature of the stance adopted by Polish 
Catholic Church since 1990s. The Catholic Church remains one of the most potent, nonpolitical 
institutions on the Polish scene. Throughout Polish history, the Catholic Church has often functioned 
not only as a religious organization, but also as an institution within which national feelings could be 
expressed. Since 1989, the Church has had a hard time adjusting to its new role as a religious body in 
a sovereign and democratic state. The general trend has been toward the gradual withdrawal of the 
Church from politics, but by means of a peculiar cyclic movement. 75 The next section describes 
historical route of the Catholic Church to become more diplomatic in the political space. 
1. Historical Structure of Polish Catholic Church after 1980s 
With the fall of Communism, in which the Church played a significant role, the attitudes of 
some clergy members and secular Catholic activists displayed a triumphant attitude and a hope that 
Poland would become the center of the new evangelization of Europe. This stance was held along 
with fear of a return of other, negative processes such as hostility towards religion and the will to 
marginalize it in the area of social life, which was believed to be the position of liberal circles, despite 
the fact that in the previous twenty years they had become closer to the Church in the common 
struggle against the communist system. This combination of glorious attitudes and fear motivated the 
Church's hierarchy to attempt to legally and institutionally sanction the freedom to propagate and 
preach the truths of the faith. The lack of understanding of democratic procedures and the habit of 
communicating with the state over the heads of society meant that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Church's activities were perceived by the public as something negative. This was particularly due to 
the Church's support of right-wing political parties that implemented controversial regulations. For 
instance, applying the obligation to respect Christian values by public TV and radio stations. Along 
75 Smolar, Aleksander. "Poland's Emerging Party System." Journal of Democracy 9.2 (1998): 122-133 
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with these activities on the part of the Church, political party activities identified with Christian 
values in a way, which was aggressive and demagogic in nature. Also, this negative image was 
influenced by the activity of Radio MafY.ia, a radio station that was very popular among radical, far 
right-wing parties, which were opposed to the idea of Poland's membership in the European Union. 
However, the attitude of the Catholic Church is of central importance to Polish society and 
politicians. Apparently, an acceptance of the European integration has been a favorable factor among 
Polish clergy since 1997. The evolution of official Polish Catholic views were expressed by the 
superiors in that year when they accepted the idea of integrated Europe. Before, skeptical views were 
broadly present among Polish clergymen. This position was present among Polish citizens and 
clergymen because of protection of Polish own identity and nationality. Since the late 1970s and 
early 1980s Poland was trying to build a unity among the clergy and Polish government. In October 
1978 Karol Wojtyla was elected Pope. The people of Poland saw this as a miracle and began to 
celebrate openly on the streets. The new Pope soon went on a pilgrimage to his homeland and there 
he spoke of combining love of Christ with the love of one's country. He also stated that the future of 
Poland lies in nonconformity, which was a smack in the face to the communists. In the 1980s, the 
Church was able to extend a bridge over the chasm that had separated the Poles for years. Workers 
and intellectuals, socialists and churchmen were brought together to fight for a common goal - to 
bring the populace together with a sense of solidarity, the sense that they were ·fighting for the same 
objective. 
Since then the Church and Pope John Paul Il constantly call for social unity, and at the same 
time, criticize the most offensive face of capitalism. Namely, the clergy critically approach drastic 
protests, the primary aim of which is to increase monetary gains. The Polish bishops remind 
businessmen that profit should not be their only goal, and convince workers that call for increase in 
wages should not be the only objective of their protests. Poverty and deprivation are certainly not 
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something the Church regards as correct or acceptable, but neither is it sufficient reason for protest or 
disorder. 
Since signing the Europe Agreements in 1991, the Polish Catholic Church has not taken any 
strong position on Polish membership in the European Union. The Church feared the loss of national 
identity by the Polish state, and tried to stay aside from expressing its opinion on the integration 
process. However, the Polish Church started to reverse its stance on this issue in 1996 during a visit 
by a delegation of Polish bishops to Brussels. This appearance not only declared that the Catholic 
Church does not fear a loss of national identity, but also showed the Church's own interest in the 
integration process. 76 
Afterwards, the clergy also announced a full support and engagement in the realization of the 
integration goal. According to bishop Pieronek who was a spokesperson of the episcopate "Europe 
should be accepted as a wonderful opportunity, a difficult challenge and a great apostolic assignment 
for the Church. "77 This statement meant that the Polish Catholic Church is not afraid of a united 
Europe. Conversely, the Church will look forward to the process of integration. Moreover, the 
support of the Church for Polish membership of the European Union is connected with goals, which 
the Church sees for itself in the future and united Europe. Namely, the Polish Catholic Church will 
attempt to restore Europe for Christianity, which still deeply determines the spirit of European 
citizens. Still, the Polish Church will endeavor to return to its European roots. However, this newly 
issued view of Polish Church has not been accepted by all members of the clergy. Some of the 
members share the postulate that the European Union is an amoral set of institutions controlled by 
strong countries. These hegemonic countries wish to reduce their weaker European counterparts to "a 
state of vassalage. "78 As for the papacy itself: it is very hard to estimate a level of support for the 
European integration. On the one hand, admiration for the Pope is tremendous, but on the other hand, 
76 Gazeta Wyborcza. Daily Newspaper. Nov. 10, 1997 
77 --. Dec 6-7,1997 
78 ---. April 21, 1999 
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Catholic values do not determine all Polish behavior. This aspect of Polish support for the European 
integration is described in detail in Chapter·6. 
Nonetheless, the opinions expressed during the Pope's last pilgrimage to Poland in June of 
1999 with regard to the idea of the European integration will reinforce the arguments of supporters of 
Polish membership of the European Union. In his speech to the Polish deputies in the parliament, he 
affirmed that Poland's policy towards the European Union membership is fully supported by the Holy 
See. Additionally, he elaborated that Polish people can bring to the enlarging Europe values, which 
have served them greatly in the past along with present ideas of freedom, security, and cooperation 
among those nations that still strongly curtail :from Christianity. 79 The latter feature is particularly 
stressed by the Catholic Church as an essential element for the prospect European structure. 
2. Threats and challenges to the Polish Catholic Church 
The evolution of the Church's opinions unlocks a new opportunity for a debate among 
Catholics about future European unity and Polish membership in the Union. Obviously, there is no 
doubt that the majority of the Polish clergy supports Polish entry into the European Union structures. 
According to the opinion poll conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs in February 1998 among 
Polish clergy, 84% clerical respondents accepted Polish accession to the European Union.80 
Correspondingly, according to the CBOS opinion poll, the figure for the adult population at large was 
only 66% of support for the EU membership in 1998 (Table 6.1).81 This comparison shows a strong 
support of the Catholic Church for Polish membership in the European Union structures. 
Tue Catholic Church has found itself in a difficult moral and political situation in the 1990s. 
It was obvious that a large part of the Church did not understand what democracy was, while 
79 Stadtmuller, Elzbieta. "Polish Perceptions of the European Union in the 1990s." In Cordell, Karl. EU-Poland. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2001 
80 Politvka. Weekly Magazine. March 28, 1998 
81 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Poglady na Temat Jntegracji z Unia Eurooeiska. Warsaw: CBOS July 
(July 6-9, 200le data). 
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significant wave of anticlericalism showed that many Poles did not understand that religion is rather 
public in nature and that the Church cannot limit itself simply to an interest in the private lives of 
individuals. It should not control itself because its mission is to fulfill the mission of religious 
instruction efficiently. Moreover, with the integration process in place, many unjust accusations were 
directed towards the Church. It is clear that accusing the Church of wanting to transform Poland into 
religious state had no sound basis because, at its roots, the Church had no ominous theocratic 
intentions. Social groups which misjudged the Church did not understand, either, that the Church's 
postulates such as the return of religious classes to schools, the signing of a Concordat between 
Poland and Vatican, as well as placing a reference to God in the preamble to the Constitution did not 
infringe on the principles of tolerance or the moral neutrality of the state. 82 Also, the escalation of 
the conflict related to the presence of the Church in public life was also a consequence of the 
propaganda of post-communist circles, which using Catholicism as successfully as some of the right-
wing parties used communism, made a powerful slogan out of the threat of Catholic fundamentalism. 
Moreover, it used Catholicism as the element in the election campaigns that facilitated their return to 
power. 
In the Poland of the 1990s, Church and democracy have clashed, thus weakening both. Since 
it diminished a power of both sources, the integration process with the European Union has been 
differently approached by both parties. However, to some extent, the conflict between the state and 
the Church cannot be avoided: the Church is hierarchical in character and refers to revelatory truths. 
On the other hand, Christian ethics point out the existence of unquestionable values, which can be 
cancelled by democratic processes. However, it does not mean a rejection of democracy. In fact, the 
Church emphasizes that democracy is the only political system in tune with the Christian system of 
82 Los-Nowak, Teresa. "Contemporary Government Attitudes Towards the European Union." In: Cordell, Karl. 
EU-Poland. London and New York: Routledge, 2001: 21 
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values. 83 Even though there are tensions between the state and the Church, the presence of the 
Church and the mass religiousness of Poles create an opportunity for the building of a democracy and 
a civil society on a basis of Christian values. Also, Poland does not only retain its uniqueness, but 
could be an experimental ground for the whole Europe. 
Summarv 
The Polish Catholic Church remains one of the major actors on the Polish political scene. 
Since the 1990s, the Church was able to extend a bridge over the chasm that had separated the Poles 
for years. Although the Church by itself was not clear of criticism, it has been preserved its important 
role among Polish citizens and still influences the Polish government. In recent years, the Church has 
brought together workers, intellectuals, politicians, the public, and churchmen to fight for a common 
goal of the European Union membership. As Solidarity trade union, the Polish Church is able to 
bring the populace together with a sense of solidarity; a sense that makes all Polish citizens know that 
they are all fighting for the same thing~ 
83 Doubts about tile Church's attitude towards democracy were finally removed by the encyclical of John Paul 
II, Centesimus Annus 
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CHAPTER 5. TRADE UNIONS 
Poland used to be known as a society with a high degree of unionization. The breakdown of 
the former political system, the passage to a market economy, and the profound privatization has 
affected the labor market climate and the preconditions for union representation. Poland's official 
unions declared their independence from the communist party in 1990, which restricted their agenda 
to distributive and welfare issues. At the side of the official unions was a new independent union 
called Solidarity movement. This union had broader political ambitions with roots in the support of 
new reforms and began to gradually grow in the late 1980s. However, Poland's tripartite system has 
definitively restricted the roles of traditional as well as alternative unions. Moreover, the unions 
weakened even more in 1993, partly as a function of a conflict with the government but primarily 
because the Polish economy was so bad that workers' demands for reforms became rather impossible 
to realize. Thus, Poland's major challenge is to achieve both economic and political stability, 
measuring up to the European Union standards. Concurrently, unions still have to find their role in 
this process. 
1. The central role of union structure in Poland and the conce.pt of social dialogue 
In the twelve years since the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland, numerous aspects 
of Polish life and society have changed beyond recognition. Proposals for the reform and 
rationalization of union structure were introduced in Polish politics. Thus, some important changes 
were implemented in order to presume fewer and larger unions. Because of these changes, two 
politically strong unions have prevailed: the Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ) and The All-Poland 
Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ). These two unions have been continuously working on the 
establishment of a social dialogue that would connect workers with employers, and government with 
labor unions. 
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The social dialogue has played a very crucial role in the economic, social, and political 
transformation of Poland since 1989. "It has been one of the most fatuous ofrecent devices within 
the European Union. "84 The pursuit of social dialogue within and between trade unions, in Poland 
and in the EU, is a vital requirement since unions should search for common opinion among 
themselves. Moreover, the positive development of changes in Poland would have never happened . 
without substantial contribution of the social partners. But on the other hand, the relative social peace 
and stability in the period of painful social transformation would not have been possible without a 
consensual way of concluding social accords with participation of social partners. At the same time, 
the practice of social dialogue has contributed to the evolution of social partners and institutions. It 
has been widely accepted as the best method of solving political and socio-economic problems or 
conflicts. Moreover, by the adoption of the new Polish Constitution in 1997, the social dialogue 
became a base of the legal system in Poland. 
Furthermore, the dialogue and cooperation of the social partners are pillars of the social 
market economy. This :fundamental constitutional principle is a cornerstone of social relations in 
Poland and may contribute to the :further development of institutions of the social dialogue, not only 
in the national, but also in the international arena. However, one of the particularities of the social 
dialogue instruments in Poland is the fact that special significance has been attributed to the tripartite 
dialogue. In fact, this dialogue is recognized as the most vital factor of social relations or at least 
much more important then in most countries of the European Union. This is probably a consequence 
of two interrelated factors. 
Firstly, the fact that employers' organizations did not exist in the beginning of the 
transformation and have still remained relatively weak puts the government in a rather strong 
position. 
84 Hyman, Richard Understanding European Unionism. London: Sage Publications, 200 I: 174 
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Secondly, the fact that legal changes linked to the political and economic transformation, as 
well as development of social relations, had to be channeled to the Parliament through the 
government anq its agencies, which was the most logical path of transforming the system. 85 
Thus, the Tripartite Commission was created on the basis of the Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers in 1994. This was one of the results of negotiations between the government and social 
partners, especially trade unions, whose main criticism of the Commission's functioning focused on 
the fact that it was not anchored enough in the legal system, which gave the government a privileged 
position. 86 Thus, there are expectations that the Commission, which is well enshrined in the 
legislation, will be more efficient. The most controversial issue that the Commission has been facing 
in recent years is that of the new Tripartite Commission law. This provides that collective bargaining 
between trade unions and employers could be held within the Commission and that national collective 
agreements could be concluded within its framework. 
Although the new legislation is not yet operating, I think that it may create a possibility of 
state interference into the regular bilateral relations between trade unions and employers' 
organizations. If this will be the case, social partners will certainly vigorously oppose such a threat. 
It needs to be mentioned that collective bargaining is considered by trade unions as a cornerstone of 
industrial relations, even though it still remains a rather weak element of the social dialogue. 
There are several reasons for that, resulting from the situation of both trade unions and 
employers as well their attitudes. Trade uniori density is low in Poland and according to different 
estimates, ranges between 17% and 25%. 87 Moreover, labor unions are fragmented and sometimes 
unwilling to cooperate with each other. The OPZZ and NSZZ have an extremely hard time to meet 
their needs in the collective bargaining since their programs differ enormously. 
85 It could be also found in the NSZZ program at <http://www.solidamosc.org.pl> 
86 Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs. <http://www.ipu.org/Splz-e!Tripart2.htm> 
87 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Polish People on Trade Unions. Warsaw: CBOS July (July 6-9, 200lf 
data). 
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The NSZZ puts a special emphasis on the tripartite dialogue, which is a consequence of a 
specific Polish experience of social pacts from the past decade. Also, employers' organizations.are 
still not very well structured. Most employers especially multinationals are not members of any 
organization, which results in an excess of company level concurrences and difficulties in concluding 
national sectoral collective agreements. 
In order to support development of labor unions, the social dialogue is also connected to the 
European integration process. There is a consensus of all major social actors in Poland about the 
enlargement of the European Union and Poland's accession. Even though the negotiations with the 
European Commission are very difficult and time consuming, the harmonization of the Polish 
legislation with the 'acquis' is going relatively smoothly and without major controversies. There 
exist several mechanisms and institutionalized forms of consultation with social partners concerning 
the government's position on different issues covered by the accession negotiations. The ongoing 
process of Poland's integration with the structures of the European Union is one of the biggest 
challenges for both the OPZZ and the NSZZ. However, the OPZZ and the NSZZ differ in their 
approaches to meet the new challenges lined out in the 'acquis.' 
For the NSZZ, to achieve international cooperation and to meet the European Union criteria, 
trade unions should participate in the social dialogue on the national arena. 88 Thus, the government 
has created a number of working groups within its ministries where social partners have a chance to 
express their position in all fields of the 'acquis. ' 89 For the OPZZ, entering the European structures, 
particularly in its initial period, can bring various dangers for the employers and their families as well 
as for the Polish economy. The minimalization of these dangers can be achieved by developing 
international cooperation and fuller participation of the Polish sectoral trade union movement in 
88 According to the NSZZ program at <http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl> 
89 In 1999, the Prime Minister's Office established the National Council for Integration gathering leaders of all 
representative trade unions and employers' organizations as well as experts. Also, the Consultation Committee 
with the social partners' representatives as the negotiator in chief. Moreover, the Liaison Committee with the 
European Economic and Social Committee was established in order to bring trade unions, employers' 
organizations and third interest groups together 
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various forms of the international social dialogue. Those forms may be accomplished through 
common activities together with European trade union movements or through bilateral contacts with 
all national trade union headquarters of the European states.9° Furthermore, this approach does not 
levy the responsibilities of the all-country trade union organizations for their own fields of action. 
Also, the OPZZ is "against random introduction oflaws being in force in the European Union, 
separated from a wider context of social and economic conditions existing in Member States. These 
changes must have a complex dimension and precise schedule of implementation - they must be 
understandable from the social standpoint and acceptable. "91 
Personally, one of the most vital results of the consultation process linked to accession 
negotiations was a consensus that the social 'aquis' should be fully integrated into the Polish 
legislation. While the NSZZ approach emphasizes domestic cooperation and social dialogue, the 
OPZZ tries to reach a consensus through international agreements. Yet, prior to a full creation of 
international cooperation and adoption of the European social model, the liberalization of the labor 
code and industrial relations on a domestic level is needed. The NSZZ trade union organizations 
believe that the European social 'acquis' will give them necessary guarantees and more room for 
negotiating the liberalization and flexibility of the labor code and industrial relations. 
2. Threats and Challenges to Polish Trade Unionism 
Traditional unions began to change in 1993. The parliamentary elections that took place in 
September of 1993 brought a victory of a coalition consisting of the post-communist Left Democratic 
Union and the Peasant Party, a previous satellite of the Communist party. This victory was a result of 
the frustration of the electorate, people's discontent with the neoliberal policy carried out by the 
governments in 1990-1993, the populist electoral campaign conducted by post-communist political 
90 More on the OPZZ could be found at <http://www.opzz.org.pl> 
91 Ibid. 
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groupings and the diffusion of democratic parties. This government did not keep its promises. 
Although the economic growth was a statistical improvement in 1996 as the fourth successful year of 
GDP growth, these relatively promising economic results did not affect workers because of the lack 
of a social safety net and growing differences between the rich and the poor.92 This further 
degradation of worker groups and the social atmosphere together with the domination of the old and 
new nomenclature in state and local administration (as well as in finance and business circles), 
resulted in the frustration of trade union members. All of those difficulties and lack of pro-labor 
political alternatives have declined the membership participation within labor unions. 
According to a new report from a United Nations' Agency, labor union membership dropped 
in most industrialized countries between 1985 and 1995.93 Additionally, the International Labor 
Organization attributed the decline to a shift away from manufacturing and the loss of many 
unionized jobs. According to this report, the sharpest membership declines took place in Central and 
Eastern Europe - from 21.8 million workers to 14 million over the ten-year period. This decline is 
largely a result of the end of compulsory unionism. In Poland, union membership plunged by 46%. 
Although the report also claims that labor remains at least as influential as before -the OPZZ labor 
union was instrumental in electing left-of-center governments after 1993 in Poland-the current 
opinion polls, government reports, and the socio-economic situation of the Polish state do not support 
this notion. Although, unions have seen membership fall (tellingly, the NSZZ and the OPZZ no 
longer publish their figures), they still have many friends on both sides of the lower house of the 
Polish government.94 Even though the politics of trade unions may be messy (through numerous 
strikes and protests), it is clearly marked in trade unions' programs. Their path to membership of the 
European Union prevails as the most important aspect of their programs. 
92Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Polish People on Trade Unions. Warsaw: CBOS July (July 6-9, 200lf 
data). 
93 Greenhouse, Steven. "Union Membership Drops Worldwide, U.N. Reports." New York Times on the Web. 4 
Nov. 1997, 25 Nov. 2001< http://www.ncpa.org/~ncpa/pi/internat/pd.inter/pdint202.html> 
94 "Limping Toward Normality." The Economist. E-mail to the author. 4 Dec. 2001 
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The most vital challenge for trade unions in Poland lies within the issue of the European 
Union enlargement. Both labor unions need to operate in the conditions of fast proceeding 
globalization of the Polish economy due to its opening for the global markets and the integration of 
Poland with the European Union. It raises new problems for trade unions. These problems are 
connected to the threats that endanger the Polish economy. Both unions are involved in the common 
issues, extending outside the field of the sectoral trade unions' structure activities. The scope of 
interests considers legislation of labor law, social policy, and employment policy with active forms of 
counteracting unemployment. This part is the most crucial for the NSZZ since the majority of its 
members are farmers. For example, within the Union, farmers are likely to lose their privileged 
position, and those industrial sectors in which Poland now has a competitive advantage will also be 
on the losing side. In addition, "this sector of the Polish economy is plagued by low productivity, and 
underemployment is estimated at between 1.5-2 million persons."95 Also, farmers do not contribute 
to budget revenues in that they do not pay state income tax (only local farming taxes). However, if 
cheap and relatively skilled Polish labor is allowed to enter the European Union market, some 
Western Europeans are likely to lose their jobs. In Poland, the rapid restructuring of the economy and 
politics is likely to benefit young, mobile and educated people living in big cities. Those who do not 
share these characteristics will find it difficult to cope with the mounting changes and are likely to 
end up on the losing side. A radical improvement in the sector is unlikely in the next several years 
and the state of Polish agriculture will be a major sticking point in Poland's negotiations with the 
European Union. 
In order to meet the European Union needs, Polish labor unions will have to alter a structure 
that is essentially regional to one that is also sectoral. A move in that direction had already begun in 
1989 with the creation of a nonregional union for hospital workers. This move was implemented by 
95 "Agriculture Will Continue to be a Drag on Growth." Polish Library 25 Nov. 2001. 25 Nov. 2001 
http://www.masterpage.com.pl/outlook/amcham3 .html. 
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the NSZZ labor union. Moreover, the OPZZ considers the creation of new trade union structures, 
particularly in the private sector. Since Poland moved from a centrally governed economy into a 
market-oriented economy, this sector plays an important role in Polish politics. Thus, new inter-
company structures should be initiated for the employers of companies in which, due to a small 
number of employees, trade unions cannot be set up. The system of cooperation among the ties of the 
trade unions and the support for integrational initiatives should be still under improvement. In spite 
of this, the European Union institutions also lack the structure and the desire to become active in the 
industrial relations domain. Thus, not only do unions remain weak and dominated by national 
structures, but also employer organizations and firms in Poland and in the European Union are 
reluctant to engage in such an activity as liberalization oflabor laws and institutions. 
Another challenge faced by trade unions is that they are becoming ineffective in their programs when 
they should be more influential in governing the country. According to the people asked by the poll 
of Public Opinion Research Center, which was conducted after adoption of the Act on Tripartite 
Commission for Social and Economic Affairs in July of 2001, only 8% of the respondents declared 
membership in a trade union organization with 3% in NSZZ trade union and 2% in OPZZ trade 
union. Almost 73% are of the opinion that trade unions are ineffective in defending the workers' 
interests. Only 13% are of the contrary opinion. Although, the NSZZ and the OPZZ are considered 
as the most effective, their positive notes decrease regularly. Almost two-thirds (65%) of the 
respondents wished the unions had had greater influence on governing the country. Only 8% of those 
surveyed think that the unions' influence is too high. While asking about a protection of workers 
interests, 47% of the respondents do not see any effective method. 16% pointed at tripartite 
negotiations and 10% declared strikes and protests as ways to protect workers interests. Most of the 
trade union members are in state-owned companies (33%), and 6% are in private ones. The union 
members are more aware of the possibility ofloosingjobs than non-members. There are also 
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differences in perceiving the situation of companies. 55% of trade union members stated the 
condition as bad, and this opinion is shared only by 27% of non-members.96 
The effectiveness of trade unions in defending the workers' interests is very low. 
Simultaneously, the number ofrespondents who want to increase the influence of employers' 
organizations on the government's decisions is dramatically rising. Currently, a majority of Polish 
respondents declares that the influence on governing the country is unproductive. There exists an 
opinion among Polish society that none of the trade unions represents the workers' interests. It needs 
to be noted that trade union members are as skeptical towards effectiveness of trade unions as those 
who are not members. Hopefully, the liberalization and regulation of the labor code through the 
Tripartite Commission will consolidate the current social dialogue among social actors in Poland. 
Summary 
This chapter has argued that two major trade unions in Poland; The All-Poland Alliance of Trade 
Unions (OPZZ) and Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ), are not simply passive actors at the receiving 
end of commands of national politics; rather they are crucial actors in the creation of the politics, 
especially through collective bargaining, while establishing their future role in the European Union 
sphere. Clearly, there is a vivid relationship among trade unions, employer organizations, and the 
Polish government that is represented by the social dialogue issue. However, new challenges and 
threats to trade union effectiveness have an impact on the market economy, the administrative 
structures, and the public at large. Furthermore, to increase its effectiveness, the trade unions must 
participate in the tripartite structure on a domestic level or the unions must find allies in the 
international environment, for example, in the European Trade Unions' Confederation. Moreover, 
labor groups may improve in their effectiveness through influencing corporate and state policy. The 
96 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Polish People on Trade Unions. Warsaw: CBOS July (July 6-9, 200lf 
data). 
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current process of enlargement may have an impact on labor unions' efficiency by moving national 
labor activity into the international setting. Thus, enlargement brings new challenges not only for the 
Polish state, but also for the European Union structures, market behavior, and socio-economic norms. 
This new challenge means that unions are increasingly looking beyond basic issues and reaching out 
to unprotected workers· and other social, international unions to form a broader coalition. 
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CHAPTER 6. PUBLIC OPINION 
Poland is at a historic point as it stands on the doorstep to the European Union and has 
enjoyed one of the highest levels of support.for EU membership. The most important aspect of 
eastward enlargement is the question whether this prospective membership is likely to have any 
impact on domestic politics and public opinion in this applicant country. This issue is a pivotal tool 
for future enlargement since it assumes a progressing outline in its internal political debates as the 
accession negotiations proceed. 
This chapter focuses on how the European Union membership will impact on domestic 
debates within Poland, and how internal factors influence citizen attitudes toward the EU 
membership. Poland represents a very interesting case study because it already is one of the most 
difficult applicants to accommodate by the European Union. Moreover, it has had one of the highest 
levels of support for the European Union membership. It also shows more complex, but advanced 
political discussion than in other applicant countries. 
This chapter begins by examining the altering patterns of support for the European Union 
membership. I argue that we should not be surprised that Polish people have become progressively 
more skeptical about the EU membership since the accession negotiations began in 1998. Even 
though the overall level of support still remains high, the feelings of apathy and low turnout might 
pose greater threat than outright rejection in the future referendum on the EU accession. The first part 
considers the possible reasons for this decline. In the second part, I try to predict future support for 
the European integration on a basis of factors that shape citizen viewpoints. The main objective of 
this chapter is to posit a set of main aspects that cause the declining support for the EU accession 
among Polish citizens. 
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1. Changing Patterns of Public Support 
By the year 1997, Poland received a big chance to join the European Union - a community of 
democratic states. The breaking point of all agreements and negotiation documents took place on 
July 16, 1997 when the European Commission published Agenda 2000. There exists an awareness in 
Poland that political sympathies and past contributions to Europe's democratic transformation will 
count less in those negotiations than fulfillment of membership criteria in the economic, legal, and 
social domains and the possibility of meeting the competitiveness standards of the world's biggest, 
uniform market. However, Poland's entry into the European Union is not a goal of the Polish 
government alone. The Polish public has enjoyed one of the highest levels of support for the EU 
membership since as early as 1994 (Table 6.1). For instance, in May of 1998, 66% of Poles said they 
would vote 'Yes' in a referendum on accession. Nonetheless, the number of Poles who say that they 
will vote 'Yes' in a referendum on the EU membership has fallen significantly over the last few 
years. ~dditionally, the results seem to fall rapidly down because the last opinion poll introduced by 
CBOS showed that 55% of respondents would have voted for Polish membership in the European 
Union in March of2001. Nearly, every third respondent to this survey would be opposed to the 
membership. 97 
97 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Poglady na Temat Integracji z UniaEurooeiska. Warsaw: CBOS July 
(July 6-9, 200le data) 
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Table 6.1: Polish Support for the EU Membership, 1994-2001 (in percentages) 
6/94 5/95 5/96 3/97 4/97 5/98 5/99 11/99 5/00 11/00 3/01 5/01 
Yes 
77 72 80 72 72 66 55 59 59 55 55 55 
No 
6 9 12 11 19 26 26 26 25 26 30 28 
Don't 
know 17 19 13 16 18 15 19 15 16 19 15 17 
Source: CBOS (200le) 
It needs to be added that the percentage of Poles who are very skeptical about the EU 
membership has been systematically growing. Nearly 62% of respondents think that Poland should 
remodernize the economy first and then start to fulfill other criteria. Probably for this reason one 
third of those surveyed admitted that Poland should become a full member as soon as possible since 
the membership would accelerate modernization and reparation of Polish economy. Moreover, the 
survey made known that only 6% of Poles feels that Poland gets more benefits in the present 
relationship with the European Union, while every second respondent thinks that the European Union 
gets more benefits (54%). Only every fourth surveyed believes that the relationship is mutual 
(25%)98(Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1). 
Table 6.2: Present relationship between Poland and the European Union (in percentages) 
May-99 May-00 Sep-00 Mar-01 
For the EU 39 44 50 54 
For Poland 8 8 6 6 
Mutual 30 29 26 25 
Don't know 23 19 18 15 
98 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Opinie o Integracji Polski z Unia Europejska. Warsaw: CBOS March 
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Figure 6.1: Benefits of Poland and the EU relationship (in percentages). Source: CBOS (200 la) 
As Table 6.1 shows, since Poland formally submitted its application in 1994, the number of 
Poles supporting the EU membership has declined from 77% in June 1994 to 55% in March 2001. At 
the same time, a significant segment of anti-EU opinion has begun to emerge with the number of 
opponents increasing from only 6% in 1994 to 30% in 2001. Also, every second respondent thinks 
that Poland is 'a halfway' through to fulfill the full membership criteria (47%). Every fifth 
respondent (23%) assumes that there is 'a long way' to achieve this goal, which makes 16% of those 
who think that it would take 'a very long way.' 
Generally, the overall tendency over the last seven years has been radically downward, even 
though the level of support still remains relatively high. However, beneath this hopeful and high 
support, there are a number of potentially significant indicators to suggest that the prospect of the EU 
membership provokes considerable anxieties even among enthusiasts of the EU. 
First of all, there is some evidence that Poles are becoming increasingly skeptical about 
whether or not they will actually benefit from the EU membership compared with current member 
states (Figure 6.2). This perception of a gradually more unequal relationship is rising. According to 
Figure 6.2, the number of those who believe that the existing EU member states will derive the 
greatest benefit from Polish accession has grown steadily to 54 % in March 2001. At the same time 
55 
25% of Poles believe that accession would be mutually beneficial to both Poland and the EU 
countries while only 6% cite their country as the main beneficiary. Among the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland, Hungarians most often see a profitable relationship with the European Union 
countries. 99 
Relationship b/w Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and the EU 
Czech R Hungary 
DDon't know 
DMutual 
Ill For P,C,H 
Iii For the EU 
Figure 6.2: Relationship between Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the EU (in percentages). 
Source: CBOS (200lb). 
Furthermore, a rising skepticism is confirmed by data on Polish beliefs about the effects the 
EU membership will have on both specific sectors of the economy and their living standards in 
general. In July 2001 (Table 6.3), 73% of Poles said it would have a negative effect on individual 
farms, while only 0% said it would have a positive outcome. 27% of respondents employed by 
individual, private farms said that the result would not have any influence. Similarly, 41 % of 
employed individuals in each sector of the economy said that the EU membership would have a 
negative effect on the functioning of public sector enterprises compared with only 26 who felt it 
would be positive. Even the number who believed that the EU membership would have a positive 
impact on the private business sector has fallen from 44 % in December 2000 to 34% in July 2001. 
99 More on public opinion from the Czech Republic and Poland could be found in: Kucia, Marek "Public 
Opinion in Central Europe on EU Accession: The Czech Republic and Poland" Journal of Common Marlcet 
Studies 37.l (March 1999): 143-52. The author of this article conducted a qualitative research on group 
discussions in April 1997 in the Czech Republic and Poland 
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On the other side, the negative views increased from 21 % in December of2000 to 32% in July 2001. 
This number has fallen drastically since 1994 when 67% had a positive belief and 6% a negative 
opinion on the EU membership among private businesses. Also, in terms of the impact on the 
economy, 52% ofrespondents during July's survey said that the economic situation in Poland in 
recent months would not change for better. Also, since July 2000, the percentage of those who 
classify their standard ofliving as 'dissent' (19-20%) has remained at the same level. 
Table 6.3: Labor situation and condition of Polish households (in percentages) 
Situation in a 
workolace 
VII VIII IX x XI XII I II m N v VI VII 
2000 2001 
% 
N= 496 525 531 526 522 522 487 518 510 496 499 483 480 
Good 31 33 31 30 32 31 32 33 28 29 28 24 26 
!Not Good or Bad 35 33 32 32 31 31 28 28 30 31 31 34 31 
Bad 34 31 34 36 32 36 38 37 39 34 38 40 41 
Don't know I 3 4 2 5 2 2 2 3 7 3 2 2 
Public Institutions 
Good 26 28 28 31 30 25 29 29 25 30 26 27 28 
Not Good or Bad 38 38 33 24 30 32 29 28 34 32 32 33 35 
~ad 35 33 35 43 37 40 40 41 40 31 40 39 34 
Don't know 0 1 5 2 3 3 1 1 2 7 2 1 2 
Private Enterprises 
Good 34 44 38 36 43 37 42 39 37 36 34 24 31 
Not Good or Bad 35 26 42 30 25 31 31 27 28 32 28 40 24 
Bad 31 26 19 33 26 32 27 33 34 26 37 35 43 
Don't know 0 4 2 1 6 0 1 1 0 6 1 1 1 
Private but not Ae; 
Good 44 40 38 37 38 44 36 42 34 33 35 29 34 
Not Good or Bad 33 34 32 43 36 34 28 31 29 32 36 32 31 
Bad 23 23 27 19 22 21 34 25 33 28 25 36 32 
Don't know 1 3 4 1 4 1 2 2 4 7 3 3 3 
Individual farms 
Good 0 8 7 2 6 7 15 4 4 7 6 0 0 
Not Good or Bad 24 16 18 26 29 21 18 16 25 24 26 33 27 
Bad 76 76 75 71 61 71 62 77 71 64 65 67 73 
Don't know 0 0 0 0 5 2 4 3 0 5 2 0 0 
Source: CBOS (200ld) 
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Secondly, the number of real enthusiasts for the EU membership is considerably smaller than 
the caption figure of those who say that they will vote 'Yes' in a referendum. Most Poles can be 
located in a neutral category. In other words, the best way to characterize the current state of Polish 
public opinion is that most Poles agree with the idea of EU membership but are not particularly 
enthusiastic about it. In the absence of more detailed empirical research specifically on this group, it 
is hard to convey accurately how firm or delicate this pro-European Union section of Polish public 
opinion actually is. 
2. Explanation of Declining Public Support for the European Union membership 
Hypothetically, there are a number of reasons that explain the decline of public support 
among Polish citizens during the process of accession negotiations. 100 Nevertheless, the data I will 
present in this chapter will brightly demonstrate the strong effect that political partisanship has on 
popular attitudes regarding the EU membership. The data suggest that party support may serve as a 
proxy for Polish citizen attitudes towards. European integration. Moreover, among Polish citizens, 
political partisanship is the strongest predictor of citizen attitudes next to democracy and free market 
economy. Such evidence may help to better understand variation in public opinion, and may also 
provide a stronger explanation of why economic conditions may have a more limited and indirect 
effect on levels of EU support. Regardless of ideology, citizen attitudes in Poland are shaped by 
partisanship in terms of political party's position on the European integration. It is a very crucial 
aspect since voters may use party attachment as a proxy to answer questions on EU membership. In 
order to explain this phenomenon I present some reasons for which citizens of Poland lean towards 
certain preferences. 
100 For an interesting discussion on this, see Kolarska-Bobinska, Lena. "Rozmowa z Unia Europejska." 
Rzeczpospolita, 18 March 1998. 
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Firstly, the issue of Polish membership in the European Union has been a subject of a great 
consensus among the main political parties, groupings, and elites. Until present, no major political 
grouping has questioned EU membership as a major objective of Polish foreign policy. Moreover, all 
the parties and electoral blocs that won parliamentary seats in 1997 elections declared their support 
for the EU accession. By the same token, this strong consensus among political elites up to this point 
of time does not reflect the realism of factual stage of support for Polish accession to the European 
Union. In this sense the current figures are simply a more realistic reflection of the true level of 
support for the membership (Table 6.4).101 
Table 6.4: Electoral blocs on Polish membership in the EU (in percentages) 
Electoral Blocs Yes No Don't know 
UW-The Union for Freedom 97 3 0 
PO-The Civic Platform 83 13 4 
A WS-The Solidarity Election Action 70 23 7 
SLD+UP- The Democratic Left 
Alliance and the Labor Union 54 35 11 
PSL-The Polish Peasant Party 28 53 19 
Not Decided 56 23 21 
Not Intended to vote 51 30 19 
Source: CBOS (200 la) 
Secondly, there has also been very little serious debate about the potential costs and benefits 
of the EU accession and the issue has had practically no significance in the everyday lives of Polish 
citizens. Relatively, the debate has been embedded in broad geopolitical and historical terms rather 
than focusing on political, social, and economic issues. According to CBOS, in August 1997, 41 % of 
Poles felt that the EU membership would bring Poland more well than harm, the number who said it 
would benefit them or their families personally felt to 27%, while nearly 31 % did not know how the 
101 The useful survey of Polish parties' attitudes to EU membership in the run-up of September 1997 elections 
could be found in Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej. Polacy o Integracii z Unia Europejska. Warsaw: OBOP 
October (October 1999a data) 
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process would affect them. 102 Hitherto, the levels of Polish support for the EU membership did not 
really represent a conscious affirmation of support and were created on unstable foundations. 
Thirdly, it was inevitable that the introduction of the actual accession negotiations would 
reduce the level of support for Polish EU membership. As I mentioned above, Poland will be a very 
problematic new member and will also have to confront economic and social consequences. In recent 
months, painful economic and social reforms have taken place in Poland, therefore, the public support 
for the EU membership dropped drastically. The social atmosphere aggravated among Polish citizens 
in the month of July 200 I. Over 77% of respondents determine the whole situation in Poland as 
critical. Polish citizens have been talking about the critical social moods since a very long time. 
Overall, this aspect has had a falling tendency since the beginning of this calendar year.103 However, 
Poland has not noted such a critical tendency since 1992. 
Importantly, this decline in public support for the EU membership has been exacerbated by 
the way the Polish Eurodebate has been conducted in the months since the September 1997 
parliamentary elections.104 The most important aspect of it was a breakup of the pro-European Union 
elite consensus and the creation of the first organized and potentially significant force to adopt an 
anti-European Union stance - the Polish Agreement (Porozumienie Polskie PP). The Polish 
Agreement was set up in April of 1999 and registered formally as a political party in November of the 
same year by a number or groupings associated with the Catholic nationalist right. 105 
Fourthly, one of the most vital aspects of this politicization of the Polish debate on the EU 
membership has been the division of the pro-European Union camp into those who are 'soft' and 
prepared to give in to Brussels and those who favor a 'tough' road of negotiations. There are two 
102 Ibid. 
103Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej. Nastroje Spoleczne w Liocu. Warsaw: CBOS July (July 6-9, 200ld 
data) 
104 Szczerbiak, Aleks. "Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 39.1(2001):105-22 
105 Gazeta Wvborcza. Daily News. 26 April 1999. 
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significant examples of this kind of rationalizing among the main parties and groupings currently 
operating on the Polish political scene. 
One of the most influential streams comes from the Christian-National Union (Zjednoczenie 
Chrzescijansko-Narodowe, ZChN). The ZChN does not look at the European Union with a great 
enthusiasm. Although, the union is not completely opposing the European Union membership, it 
explicitly states in its program ''we are in favor of a Europe of free nations seeking their inspiration in 
the Bethlehem grotto."106 The party's program sets out some conditions that the party supports for 
the Polish EU membership, for instance, freedom to opt out of the euro, the maintenance oflegal 
sovereignty in certain spheres, rejection of European citizenship, and so forth. 107 Interestingly, the 
formation of the Polish Agreement has changed the center of gravity in the Polish EU debate in a way 
that makes the ZChN's conditions appear more moderate and ordinary. 
The second main stream comes from the agrarian-populist Polish Peasant Party (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), which emerged in 1990 after first democratically implemented 
parliamentary election. The PSL party has traditionally adopted a so-called 'twin-track' approach 
towards Polish membership in the European Union. 108 Officially, it has always been in favor of 
Poland's membership. However, the party urged that Poland should accept the EU membership only 
on condition that it is mutually advantageous. 109 In the other means, at the same time as supporting 
the broad objective pf the EU membership, the party has also attempted to tap into the fears of those 
who have reservations, particularly among farmers from rural areas of the country. For instance, the 
party argued in favor of transitional periods for Poland's agricultural sector with simultaneous access 
to the same kind of farm subsidies currently available to other EU member states.110 
106 Zawisza, Andrzej. "Eurosceptyk nad Wisla" Gazeta Wyborcza. Daily Newspaper. 17 Dec. 1999 
107 More onZChN's program see <http://www.awsp.pl/program.html> 
108 Szczerbiak, Aleks. "Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 39.1 (2001): 105-22 
109 Parliamentacy debate on the European Union accession. 19 March 1998 
110 More onPSL's program see: <http://www.psl.org.pl> 
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This particular political debate encourages political parties to compete with one another for 
the mantle of most effective defender of national interests. On the other hand, these parties have tried 
to defend their political interests in order to enhance the level of support among Polish citizens. 
However, an OBOP survey revealed that the number of Poles who said that they trusted their EU 
negotiators to defend the national interests fell from 51%inDecember1998 to 42% in October 1999, 
while the number who said that they did not trust them increased from 36% to 42% over the same 
period oftime. 111 
This trend towards the politicization of Polish debate on the EU membership exacerbated 
during 2000 presidential election when the pro-EU, A WS-backed candidate Marian Krzaklewski felt 
it was necessary to make skeptical overtures towards the anti-EU elements on the Polish right, and 
which attempt cost him the presidential seat to former communist, unequivocally pro-EU incumbent 
Aleksander K wasniewski. 112 
Furthermore, there is also another segment of the public that views Europe as a remote, or 
even hostile, institution, with structures that can seem anonymous and distant. The citizens feel quite 
defenseless when faced with something that they are ignorant of. The link between the Union's 
objectives and the actions of the applicant states are no longer clear. The functioning of Polish and 
the European Union institutions is becoming increasingly complex. As a result, the legitimacy of the 
institutions is being challenged. The most important factor of it is a lack of comprehension if not 
skepticism that is not natural to Polish citizens. This melancholy affects the representative system of 
Polish state. The most visible symptom of this is a low turnout at national elections. Moreover, 
people have some uncertainties about European integration and the European Union institutions. By 
the same token, the public's support for developing the Polish foreign, security, and defense policies 
111 Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej. Polacy o Integracji z Unia Elll'Ooejska. Warsaw: OBOP October 
(October 1999a data) 
112 More on the 2000 presidential election in: Jasiewicz, Krzysztof. "Pocketbook or Rosary? Economic and 
Identity Voting in the 2000 Presidential Election in Poland" Paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September 2, 2001 
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is evident to have a positive and generous influence for the future membership. These features are 
achieved through honest and open dialogue with citizens. In this connection, Polish citizens should 
be more engaged in a political debate that would help them to make up their own minds. The citizens 
are no fools, so there should not be any fear to eliminate the public from the political debate. The 
purpose of the debate should be to listen to the aspirations of people and to engage in an exchange 
based on rhetoric and concrete argumentation. In this process, the role of the media starts to play a 
critical role. 
Summmy 
Polish citizens have become increasingly skeptical about the European Union membership 
over the last few years. Indeed, all the polls indicate that it is a fear of the socio-economic 
consequences of the European Union membership that lies at the root of anxieties about what many 
Poles may see as a pre-mature accession. 
Moreover, the political debate that takes place in Poland in recent years may reinforce the 
idea of the European Union accession as an elite-driven process, from which only a narrow, wealthy 
section of Polish population will benefit. This danger has been aggravated by Polish governments' 
attempts to shift the blame for unpopular decisions on the European Union institutions and by the 
recent politicization of the Polish Eurodebate. Although the overall level of support for the European 
Union membership remains high it may suffer some further difficulties. One of them may be a 
danger that a large portion of Poles may decide not to participate in a referendum on the European 
Union membership even though a majority would likely vote 'yes.' 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
The negotiations between Poland and the European Union began officially in the spring of 
1998 and effectively in the fall of that year. By June 2000 all the negotiating chapters had been 
opened and negotiations had been provisionally finished on eleven chapters (Table 7.1). Thus, 
progress has been smooth, regular, and in some sense predictable. In those areas where Poland has 
asked for transitional periods or special arrangements, the response of the EU member states has 
generally been to ask for more information or to ask Poland to reconsider its position. 113 This 
response is also normal and to some extent understandable. The EU member states will need the 
maximum amount of information possible in order to consider deviations from the 'acquis' in some 
areas; this is especially so because of granting transition periods for applicant countries. 
When the negotiations are finished and the accession treaty is ratified, Poland will become a 
member of the European Union. The enlargement will influence the shape of the European Union 
and Poland's place in the world. However, the uncertainty caused by constant change is balanced by 
certain stable elements of Polish politics. The political parties, the Catholic Church, trade unions, and 
the public at large highly influence a process of becoming a member of the European Union 
community. These stable factors are very crucial because they guarantee tangible and intangible 
benefits for both Poland and the European Union: the maintenance of community values, widening 
the zone of stability and peace as well as strengthening of the internal domestic market and 
sociopolitical development. 
One of the most important aspects of eastward enlargement that was investigated in my thesis 
is the question whether this prospective membership is likely to have any impact on domestic politics 
in this applicant country. This issue is an essential factor for future enlargement since it assumes a 
progressing outline in its internal political debates as the accession negotiations proceed. Also, the 
113 In case of purchase of land by EU citizens, Poland adopted its negotiating stance on March 1, 2002 by 
deciding that EU farmers, who are already cultivating leased land in Poland, will be able to purchase it after 
three or seven years from the signing of the lease agreement 
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European Union membership will impact domestic debates within Poland, and how internal factors 
influence citizen attitudes toward the EU membership. Poland represents a very interesting case 
study because it already is one of the most difficult applicants to accommodate by the European 
Union. Moreover, it has had one of the highest levels of support for the European Union 
membership, and it shows more complex, but advanced political discussion than in other applicant 
countries. 
Furthermore, two major trade unions in Poland: The All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions 
(OPZZ) and Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ) are crucial actors in the creation of the politics, 
especially through collective bargaining, while establishing their future role in the European Union 
sphere. Clearly, there is a vivid relationship among trade unions, employer organizations, and the 
Polish government that is represented by the social dialogue issue. In order to increase trade unions' 
effectiveness, they must participate in the tripartite structure on a domestic level or the unions must 
find allies in the international environment. Even though the issue of European membership has 
become more politicized in Poland after the 200 I parliamentary elections, there is no evidence at the 
elite level that attitudes toward integration and Europe can be regarded as an independent cleavage 
line. It becomes more visible that the issue of integration tends to play a positional role among 
political parties. As the negotiations move on to even more specific issues, the probability is that the 
situation could change, as there at the mass media level. 
Also, the presence of the Catholic Church influences domestic politics and views on the 
European Union membership. Even though the phenomenon of Polish Catholic Church has been 
criticized since the early 1990s, the Church just like Polish society, government, and other political 
actors underwent a long period of transformations after 1989. Moreover, it has become more 
optimistic about the European Union integration process and the issue of national identity. 
By virtue of Poland's accession, the European Union gains a strong partner determined to 
help shape internal and external policies of the European Union as well as to maintain peace, 
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democracy, and economic prosperity in this part of the region. This, after all, has always been the 
motivation behind the European integration process. 
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Table 7.1: Status of Poland's accession negotiations 
Nr Negotiation position Adopted by the Submitted to 
in the area of Council of the EU 
Ministers 
1 Free Movement of Goods 26.01.99 29.01.99 
2 Freedom of Movement 27.07.99 30.07.99 
for Persons 
3 Freedom to Provide 13.07.99 15.07.99 
Services 
4 Free Movement of Capital 13.07.99 15.07.99 
5 ComoanvLaw 10.12.98 11.12.98 
6 ComDCtition Policy 26.01.99 29.01.99 
7 Am culture 23.11.99 30.11.99 
8 Fisheries 11.02.99 12.02.99 
9 Transoort Policy 13.07.99 15.07.99 
10 Taxation 19.10.99 22.10.99 
11 Economic and Monetary 26.01.99 29.01.99 
Union 
12 Statistics 10.12.98 11.12.98 
13 Social Policy and 25.05.99 31.05.99 
Emnlovment 
14 Enemv 25.05.99 31.05.99 
15 Industrial Policy 27.08.98 1.09.98 
16 Small and Medium-Sized 27.08.98 1.09.98 
Entemrises 
17 Science and Research 27.08.98 1.09.98 
18 Education, Training, and 27.08.98 1.09.98 
Youth 
19 Telecommunications and 27.08.98 1.09.98 
Information Technologies 
20 Culture and Audiovisual 27.08.98 1.09.98 
Policy 
21 Regional Policy and 23.11.99 30.11.99 
Coordination of Structural 
Instruments 
22 Environment 5.10.99 8.10.99 
23 Consumers and Health 10.12.98 11.12.98 
Protection 
24 Justice and Home Affairs 5.10.99 8.10.99 
25 Customs Union 10.12.98 11.12.98 
26 External Relations 10.12.98 11.12.98 
27 Common Foreign and 10.12.98 11.12.98 
Security Policy 
28 Financial Control 3.08.99 5.08.99 
29 Financial and Budgetary 23.11.99 30.11.99 
Provisions 
Source: EU Commission. "Understanding Negotiations." Oct. 1 2000 
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